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Polluting Medical Judgment?  False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False 
Claims for Off-Label Prescribing 
 
Sandra H. Johnson** 
Introduction 
 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug signals certification of 
the drug’s safety and efficacy at least for those purposes, at the dosing level and for the 
duration of use examined during the agency’s approval process.  Some estimates, 
however, indicate that over half of the prescription medications provided to patients in 
the U.S. may be prescribed for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose, over a longer period 
of time, or for a population (such as children) different from that for which the drug has 
been approved.1   This common practice, called “off-label” prescribing, has raised 
                                                
*This article is based on the Inaugural Fallon-Friedlander Lecture in Health and Law delivered by the 
author at the University of Chicago Law School in May 2006.  The author is grateful for the helpful 
comments of Richard Epstein, Mark Siegler, and David Meltzer on the lecture as well as Harold Edgar 
(Columbia University), Kristin Madison (University of Pennsylvania) and my colleagues Jesse Goldner and 
Tim Greaney on drafts of this article.  Contact author at johnsosh@slu.edu  Article will appear in Volume 9 
of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology (December, 2007). 
**Tenet Endowed Chair in Health Law and Ethics, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University 
School of Law and Saint Louis University Department of Health Care Ethics; Professor of Law in Internal 
Medicine, Saint Louis University School of Medicine; and Professor of Health Care Administration, Saint 
Louis University School of Public Health.   
1 David Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCH INT. MED. 1021 
(2006), estimating that approximately 21% of prescriptions overall in the medical office setting were off-
label solely in terms of the indication or purpose for which the medication was prescribed, although some 
categories of medications (specifically, cardiac medications and antihismatics for allergies) had much 
higher rates, approaching or exceeding 50%).  Off-label prescribing of medications for psychiatric 
conditions appears to be higher than that for other medical conditions.  See Hua Chen et al., Off-Label Use 
of Antidepressant, Anticonfulxant, and Antipsychotic Medications Among Georgia Medicaid Enrollees in 
2001, 67 J. CLIN. PSYCH. 972 (2006), reporting that 75% of prescriptions for antidepressants in the study 
were for off-label uses as were 80% of prescriptions for anticonvulsant medications.  See also Bernadette 
Tansey, Hard Sell:  How Marketing Drives the Pharmaceutical Industry:  A Patient’s Right to Know:  How 
Much Should Doctors Disclose About Treatments Not Approved by the FDA?, SAN FRAN. CHRON., May 1, 
2005, at A1; Maxwell J. Mehlman, Off-Label Prescribing, http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/ 
articles/bioethics/offlabel_11/ (last visited October 2, 2006)(“[E]stimates  [of off-label prescribing] run as 
high as 60% of all drug prescriptions in the United States in a given year . . . “.); David M. Fritch, Speak No 
Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient?  Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech From 
Drug Manufacturers on Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 315, n.219 (2005) (“One 
estimate indicated off-label use accounted for 40–50% of the $216 billion spent on U.S. prescription drugs 
in 2003.”).  Cf. Megan Barnett, The New Pill Pushers:  Big Pharma Watches Lawsuit Over ‘Off-Label’ 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999418
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significant concerns over the safety and efficacy of prescribed medications when they are 
prescribed outside the scope of their approval.  A study published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association (JAMA) in May, 2006, sharpened these questions when it 
reported that “most” off-label prescriptions studied had “little or no scientific support.”2    
Certainly, concerns over the effectiveness or even the safety of such off-label 
prescribing are significant, both for the health of individual patients and for the health of 
the private and public health care budgets.  The advent of the Medicare prescription drug 
benefit has intensified the interest in the phenomenon of off-label prescribing and the 
relationships between the pharmaceutical industry and practicing physicians.3  Actions 
taken to constrain off-label prescribing in response to these increasing concerns, 
however, face a serious risk of error. Counterintuitively, efforts to restrict off-label 
prescribing categorically will harm individual patients, who will be denied medication 
that may be uniquely effective though not yet definitively proven so, and upon patients 
generally by seriously reducing medical innovation and “field discovery”4 of important 
therapeutics.  
                                                                                                                                              
Prescription Drug Marketing, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 26, 2004 (stating that about 23% of 
prescriptions are for off-label uses).    
2 Radley, supra note 1, at 1021. 
3 Department of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care 
Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion, May 13, 2004, available at 
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm, quoting the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services that fraud litigation directed at off-label marketing and prescribing “sends a strong 
message in advance of the implementation of the Medicare prescription drug benefit.”  See also, Gardiner 
Harris, U.S. Weighs Not Paying for All Uses of Some Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004. 
4 The off-label use of Neurontin, the subject of the litigation discussed in Part III of this article, for 
neuropathic pain associated with shingles, was approved by the FDA in 2002 after years of off-label use for 
this purpose.  See infra, note 216 and accompanying text.  Other notable examples of effective, expanded 
uses discovered in the context of prescribing for off-label uses include the use of beta blockers for 
preventive care post heart attack; the use of Viagra for erectile dysfunction; and the use of AZT for AIDS. 
Jason K. Gross, Increased Governmental Inquiries Elevates Attorneys’ Importance to Pharmaceutical 
Companies, 185 NEW J. L. J. 330 (2006).   See also Harold J. DeMonaco et al., The Major Role of 
Clinicians in the Discovery of Off-Label Drug Therapies, MIT Sloan Working Paper 4552-05, 3, 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/529167 (defining “field discovery” as new applications of drugs that 
are discovered through “clinical practice that [is] independent of pharmaceutical company or university 
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Questions concerning the exercise of medical judgment in off-label prescribing certainly 
reflect rational concerns for individual patients, but they also reflect significant public 
policy issues relating to oversight of medical decision making.  Thus far, the dominant 
public policy response to the phenomenon of off-label prescribing practices addresses the 
issue as a particular breed of financial conflicts of interest in medicine.   
This view constructs a narrative of off-label prescribing that sees the financial 
relationships between pharmaceutical firms and practicing physicians as well as 
researchers as a corrupting influence that pollutes medical judgment.  The conflicts-of-
interest narrative of off-label prescribing mistakenly assumes that removing the 
confounding financial self-interest of doctors will result in better decisions.  In this purer 
environment, off-label prescribing, it may be assumed, will be more rational, meaning 
evidence-based, relying on the at least adequate information that will remain.   
At best, the conflicts-of-interest narrative is only a partial accounting of the 
phenomenon of off-label prescribing.  At worst, the conflict-of-interest explanation of 
off-label prescribing, standing alone, will mislead regulators because it relies on 
untenable assumptions regarding the production and diffusion of clinical knowledge.  In 
either case, the conflicts-of-interest model cannot contribute to serious efforts to 
prospectively and substantively control off-label prescribing. 
Efforts to address off-label prescribing solely as a matter of conflicts of interest 
may be important and may have some positive benefits (as well as negative effects), but 
inevitably public and private regulators will be left with the conundrum that the conflicts-
of-interest approach dodges.  Off-label prescribing decisions usually operate in the face 
                                                                                                                                              
research.”); Stephen R. Solbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs:  Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny 
in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B. U. L. REV. 93, 96 (1999).  See also discussion 
of patients’ heterogeneity infra at note 60 and accompanying text. 
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of serious gaps in research and knowledge.  Efforts to seriously restrict this prescribing 
will also operate without a firm evidentiary foundation for decision making and, thus, 
will struggle with whether particular incidences or patterns of off-label prescribing are 
“correct.”5  Furthermore, strident efforts to eliminate certain pharmaceutical industry 
behaviors that create conflicts of interest may exacerbate this knowledge gap by both 
depressing the production of clinical research and its assimilation into medical practice.   
This paper argues that the core problem in off-labeling prescribing is not the 
relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and doctors, or at least not totally so.  
Rather, the prevalence of off-label prescribing is a manifestation of patterns of learning in 
the medical profession and deficiencies in the production and dissemination of clinical 
knowledge.  Furthermore, the fraud and abuse litigation strategy currently pursued by the 
federal government to respond to industry-prescriber interactions around off-label 
prescribing buries the essential problem in a conflicts-of-interest framework.  
Part I of this article analyzes the impact of off-label prescribing patterns upon the 
market demand for post-approval clinical trials.  This Part concerns itself with how 
physicians learn and how these learning patterns depress the production of new clinical 
knowledge concerning drugs that have already been approved for release to the market 
and thus are available for off-label prescribing.  Post-approval trials, usually called post-
marketing or Phase IV trials, are critical to the public health because of limitations in the 
                                                
5 In fact, a significant gap in most research on industry influences on physician prescribing behavior is that 
the studies that identify the direction of the influence (i.e., increasing prescribing or request for inclusion in 
formularies) do not identify whether the change in prescribing produces better outcomes or otherwise 
benefits patients. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE 160 (2006); Thomas P. Stossel, Regulating Academic-
Industrial Research Relationships – Solving Problems or Stifling Progress?, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1060 
(2005).  See discussion infra text accompanying note 25.  
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testing performed during the drug approval process.6  In spite of the value of Phase IV  
clinical trials, regulatory requirements for post-approval trials are nearly non-existent; 
and the physician-prescriber market exerts only a weak demand for the production of 
clinical research on approved drugs.  Although demands for trials may be strengthening 
among other players in the health care market, the physician- prescriber market is likely 
to remain the core determinant of the volume of this research. 
Part II of this article turns the lens and examines the character, quality and volume 
of clinical research and its limited usefulness for clinical decision making.  This Part 
describes contemporary deficiencies in the production of clinical knowledge that impede 
efforts by gatekeepers or regulators to move doctors, either by incentive or penalty, 
toward a stronger reliance on scientific proof of efficacy for off-label prescriptions.  This 
Part also sets up a feedback loop between established patterns of physician learning and 
the character of contemporary clinical research efforts by demonstrating how efforts to 
control conflicts of interest in research, especially through disclosure, reinforce the 
skepticism toward scientific research on the part of practicing physicians. 
                                                
6 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 63-64.  The FDA approval process for a new drug requires 
clinical trials of the drug to test its safety and effectiveness.  Generally, these trials proceed in three 
“phases.”  Phase I trials test the metabolic and pharmacological behaviors of the medication in a small 
group of human subjects, typically between twenty and eighty persons, and are focused primarily on 
assessing the risks of the drugs.  Testing then proceeds to Phase II in which the drug is tested on a larger 
group of subjects (generally 100 to 300 individuals) and on persons with the particular disease or condition 
to which the medication is directed.  Phase III trials generally are the largest of the trials conducted prior to 
approval of a drug.  Phase III trials usually require 1,000 to 3,000 subjects.  Trials that are conducted after 
or concurrently with the approval of the drug are usually called Phase IV trials.  See W. Christopher Matton 
& F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance:  Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 
283, 298 (2004) for a brief but clear description of the FDA new drug approval process, including clinical 
trials.  The number of individuals on which a drug is tested at a pre-approval stage has increased over the 
years, from an average of 1,321 subjects in 1981-1984 to 4,237 in 1994-1995.  Office of Inspector General, 
HHS, Recruiting Human Subjects:  Pressures in Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, OEI-01-97-00195 
(June 2000) at 12.   
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Finally, the article considers the strongest current regulatory effort to constrain 
off-label prescribing at this time.  In Part III, this article examines litigation efforts 
targeted at financial relationships between doctors and pharmaceutical firms relating to 
off-label prescribing, focusing on federal litigation under the False Claims Act over one 
particular drug (Neurontin).  This prosecution produced a settlement of over $455 million 
and has spawned a significant body of copycat litigation efforts.7 
This Part uses the Neurontin litigation, and its aftermath, to sharpen the critique of 
the limits of conflicts-of-interest dominated approaches and to illustrate the information 
constraints that challenge efforts to regulate off-label prescribing more directly.   
Although the Neurontin litigation and similar cases are frequently taken as an illustration 
of the centrality of conflicts of interest in the relationships among the pharmaceutical 
industry, researchers and doctors; it is more richly studied for what it reveals about the 
nature of clinical knowledge and clinical judgment.  The litigation and its aftermath also 
raise questions about the limited impact of this type of litigation on prescribing patterns 
and illustrate the significant gap between controlling pharmaceutical-prescriber relations 
through civil and criminal litigation and transforming that effort into prospective, 
                                                
7 See infra text accompanying note 204.  It remains the largest settlement to date for litigation focusing 
solely to the marketing, educational, and research activities of a pharmaceutical firm relating to off-label 
prescribing.  Since that settlement, the government has aggressively pursued pharmaceutical firms for these 
activities, gathering significant settlements.  See, e.g., Julie Schmit, Schering-Plough to Pay $435 Million 
Settlement, USATODAY, Aug. 30, 2006, 1B (reporting settlement of government claims of fraud for 
promotion of off-label uses leading to submission of false claims against Medicaid as well as pricing 
violations);, DOJ, Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million Relating to Off-Label Promotion (Dec. 
21, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/05_civ_685.html; U.S. ex rel. Rost v. 
Pfizer, 2006 WL 2501454 (D. Mass.), regarding off-label use of human growth hormone.  See also Robert 
Brady, et al., Crackdown on “Off-Label” Pitches, National Law Journal, March, 20 2006, S1, reporting on 
settlements of actions against Serono for off-label promotion of a drug to treat AIDS wasting, as well as 
other cases. Pharmaceutical companies have also filed suit over off-label promotion by competitors.  See, 
e.g., Off-Label Use:  Zeneca, Maker of Nolvadex, Sues Eli Lilly for Claiming Evista Prevents Breast 
Cancer, 8 BNA-HEALTH LAW REPORTER 392 (March 11, 1999).   The impact of the False Claims Act 
litigation for off-label promotion has also triggered private products liability class actions and suits by 
private insurers to claim payments made for prescriptions for the drug.  See infra notes 206-207. 
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substantive control over prescribing. In addition, viewing the issues addressed in this 
article through the lens of the Neurontin litigation grounds the analysis in today’s reality 
of inadequate clinical research and limited efforts to disseminate new learning.  As off-
label prescribing attracts more attention, it is critical that efforts to constrain the practice 
not outpace the information and dissemination resources that currently exist.8   
Part I:  Weak Demand for Post-Marketing Clinical Research 
 Despite the extraordinary potential value of post-marketing clinical research for 
approved drugs, in terms of continuing safety surveillance as well as broader testing of 
effectiveness for both approved and unapproved purposes, the demand for post-marketing 
studies is quite weak.  A number of factors converge to create a weak demand for such 
research.  As discussed below, the legal framework for drug approval and for prescribing 
encourages narrow approvals and resultant off-label prescribing.  In addition, prescribing 
physicians themselves do not create a strong demand for continuing research on approved 
drugs in part because of learning patterns that tend to minimize the impact of published 
studies and formal continuing medical education . 
                                                
8The advent of the electronic medical record and the resultant large-population databanks promise lower 
cost post-approval research as the records can be mined for evidence of adverse effects as well as efficacy 
for off-label prescriptions.  Unfortunately, serious information problems will remain even in the brave new 
information world.  The data may be seriously inadequate for assessing health outcomes and may be 
inaccurate.  The databank may be proprietary to the payer, and the resultant analysis may also be so.  
Finally, problems regarding creating adequate space for clinical innovation; access to unproven but 
effective interventions; and the translation of averages to the individual patient will persist.  See James 
Walker, Electronic Medical Records and Health Care Transformation, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1118 (2005); 
Clifford Goodman, Savings in Electronic Medical Record Systems:  Do it For the Quality?, 24 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 1124 (2005).  One illustration of potential public-private information partnerships are those newly 
established between the larger managed care organizations and federal agencies, including both the federal 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and the FDA, which to this point focus almost solely on drug 
safety issues.  For analysis, see Kristin Madison, ERISA and Liability for Provision of Medical Information, 
84 N.C. L. Rev. 471, 502-504 (2006), calling for effective accountability for MCO’s as medical 
information providers.  Whether or not these concerns about the usefulness of the research constructed 
from the aggregation of patient records turn out to be well founded, these data sets are only now emerging. 
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State and federal law protect off-label prescribing.  State liability standards, for 
example, generally do not place the physician at significantly increased risk of liability 
for off-label prescribing per se.  Doctors are not subject to strict liability for prescribing a 
medication off-label.  In fact, off-label use often becomes the customary standard of care 
in particular circumstances, with the result that doctors are at risk for malpractice liability 
for failure to prescribe an approved drug for an off-label use.  Furthermore, liability 
standards typically allow a doctor to engage in off-label prescribing as a matter of 
“clinical innovation” in attempting to treat individual patients, distinguishing this practice 
from “experimentation,” and the heightened regulatory standards for informed consent 
required of experimental protocols.  Nor does state malpractice law generally require 
specific disclosure by the physician to the patient that the particular prescribed use is off-
label.9   
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)10 also respects off-label prescribing.  
The Act, which requires that a drug be approved by the FDA before it is made available 
to the market, essentially prohibits the FDA from circumscribing physician prescribing of 
approved medications, including prescribing that differs in indication, population, dose or 
duration from those approved by the FDA.11  Under the FDCA, the FDA has no authority 
to “limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe” an 
                                                
9 For an overview of liability risks for off-label prescribing, see Mehlman, supra note 1.  But see 
Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (court held that the fact that a drug use was off-
label could be introduced as evidence that the prescribing physician deviated from the standard of care).  
Pharmaceutical firms have been found liable for injuries related to off-label uses when they have actively 
promoted those uses and concealed adverse effects. Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1997).   
10 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
11 The FDA, however, does regulate pharmaceutical firms’ behavior in relation to promoting off-label uses.  
The FDA prohibits pharmaceutical firms from marketing drugs for off-label uses, but allows companies to 
engage in limited educational and research efforts related to off-label prescribing. The limitations on firm 
behavior in relation to promotion of off-label uses are discussed below, in the context of the Neurontin 
litigation.   
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approved medication within the context of a legitimate physician-patient relationship.12  
The intention of this provision is to avoid federal interference with the practice of 
medicine,13 a somewhat quaint notion at this point but alive in this situation 
nonetheless.14 
 Federal drug law, however, does more than merely respect off-label prescribing.15  
The design of the FDCA actually encourages the proliferation of off-label uses and a high 
frequency of off-label prescribing.  Because a drug approved for a particular purpose is 
then available to the prescribing physician for any purpose, the regulatory structure 
incentivizes pharmaceutical firms to seek a narrow approved use, at least initially, in 
order to minimize the delay to market and reduce the investment in research required to 
meet FDA standards for approval.16 The FDA only rarely requires post-approval clinical 
trials as a condition of approval,17 and the agency’s follow up on required trials has been 
uneven.18  Even though there is a simplified approval process for expanded uses of 
                                                
1221 U.S.C. § 396 (2000). 
13 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001). 
14 See generally Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of 
Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149 (2004). 
15 Of course, the federal government has other interests, and perhaps countervailing policies and authority 
as the largest payer of drugs, including off-label prescriptions.  As will become apparent in the later 
discussion of the Neurontin litigation, these interests have not operated as a significant prospective 
counterweight to the incentives in the FDCA regulatory structure. See discussion infra text accompanying 
notes 220-45. 
16 Mitchell Oates, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment Through Production and Disclosure of 
Research Into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1280 (2005). 
17The FDA may require post-marketing clinical trials in two circumstances: first, if the drug was approved 
under the fast-track provision for getting drugs to market in the case of life-threatening diseases; second, in 
the rarest cases where testing a drug on human beings is unethical, the FDA requires testing when 
circumstances make such testing feasible and ethical.  21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2000) and 21 C.F.R. § 
314.610(b)(1) (2002).  In addition, the FDA may require post-marketing clinical trials where testing is 
needed to assure that particular drugs used by a substantial number of children are safe and effective for 
pediatric use. 21 U.S.C. 355(c) (2000).  FDA regulations do provide for post-marketing surveillance, 
requiring that the manufacturer report any new information concerning safety and efficacy periodically.  
These regulations, however, do not require that the drug be submitted to formal clinical trials.  
Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/Postmarketing/ 
surveillancepost.htm (last visited October 8, 2006). 
18 A 2006 GAO study reported that generally the agency’s postmarketing surveillance system suffered from 
a lack of clarity, insufficient oversight, and a lack of clear criteria for decisions.  In addition, the GAO 
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already approved drugs,19 regulatory incentives to invest in expanded approval are 
uneven at best.20   
 Of course, the market could provide incentives for continuing research on 
approved drugs despite weak regulatory mandates.  If physicians in practice refused to 
prescribe drugs beyond the use, duration, population or dosage for which they have been 
approved, firms would be incentivized by the prescriber market to seek broader approval 
expeditiously.  The frequency and breadth of off-label prescribing, however, provide 
strong inferential evidence that doctors do not regard FDA approval as a necessary 
indicator of effectiveness (e.g., when they prescribe for an unapproved use) and perhaps 
even safety (e.g. when they prescribe at unapproved dosages or durations or for 
significantly distinct populations on which the drug has not been tested).  In view of the 
serious constraints of the formal approval process, at least in terms of the time lag and the 
capacity of the FDA, a practice of awaiting formal approval for each indication is 
impractical; may harm patients; and actually may violate the standard of care in particular 
                                                                                                                                              
criticized the FDA’s follow up on postmarketing trials that it had required.  GAO, Improvement Needed in 
FDA’s Postmarket Decision-Making and Oversight Process (March 2006), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf .  The problems extend to medical device issues as well as 
pharmaceuticals.  See FDA Briefing Addresses Problems in Medical Device Postmarket Surveillance 
System (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=35193. 
19 Oates, supra note 16, at 1285.   
20 See, e.g., Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002), which 
created incentives for testing approved drugs in children in terms of extension of patent protection for those 
drugs.  The intersection of patent law with the FDCA diminishes incentives for seeking approval of 
expanded uses of an approved drug.  In the context of Neurontin, for example, it is possible that approval of 
expanded uses was not sought because of the anticipated expiration of the patent protection of the drug.  
Department of Justice, supra note 3.  Revenue from sales of Neurontin fell 77% when patent protection 
expired.  Hoover’s In-Depth Company Records, Pfizer, Inc. (March 7, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 
4302915.  Of course, the FDCA limitation on promotion of approved drugs for off-label uses targeted to 
physician-prescribers could create an incentive for seeking approval, but ordinarily doesn’t do so, as 
described below.  See discussion infra accompanying notes 22-23. The emergence of pre-emption of state 
products liability claims for drugs that are prescribed as approved may create an incentive for seeking 
formal approval of expanded uses, but it is too early to tell.   
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circumstances.  The practice of off-label prescribing, then, would seem to be a rational 
reaction to the limitations of the formal approval process.21 
While prohibiting off-label prescribing by requiring formal FDA approval for 
every indication, dose, duration of therapy, and population for which an approved drug 
may be prescribed is impractical, practicing doctors could instead as a general rule refrain 
from prescribing medications until they are at least proven effective and safe, even if not 
formally approved, for the particular prescription contemplated.  One may argue that the 
practice of medicine, to the extent that it relies on a scientific model of knowledge, would 
demand no less than substantial proof of safety and effectiveness prior to off-label 
prescribing.  If doctors did so, pharmaceutical firms would confront a strong market 
demand for post-marketing clinical trials,22 and the weakness of the regulatory 
requirements for post-marketing research would become less significant.   
                                                
21 Some have argued that these limitations in the drug approval process argue in favor of dismantling the 
entire system.  See, e.g., Daniel B. Klein and Alexander Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?, REG., June 1, 
2004, at 60.  
22 Of course, doctors are not the only gatekeepers for prescribed drugs.  Most health plans and 
pharmaceutical benefit management programs, however, do little to confine off-label prescribing, although 
they are actively engaged in significant efforts to influence physician and patient demand on other fronts, 
including, for example, shifting from expensive to less expensive substitute formulations (“fail first” 
requirements)  or to generic drugs or creating tiered benefits or increased co-pays or requiring 
preauthorization, or, in the case of Medicaid programs simply limiting the number of prescription drugs 
that will be reimbursed for each patient, among other methods.  Soumerai, supra note 22, describing these 
methods; J.D. Kleinke, Access Versus Excess:  Value-Based Cost Sharing for Prescription Drugs, 23 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 34, 42 (2004), noting that the private insurance sector has “mostly abandoned” the 
“command-and-control . . . and other first-generation management strategies” for pharmaceuticals.   See 
also, Rachel Christensen Seithi, Prescription Drugs:  Recent Trends in Utilization, Expenditures, and 
Coverage, Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief No. 265 (January 2004), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0104ib.pdf, reporting on a general decline in the number of employers 
using substantive controls.  See also, the discussion of Medicaid coverage policy infra notes 182-190 and 
220-240 and accompanying text.  Consumer behavior also can create an incentive for postmarketing 
research and formal approval of an approved drug for an off-label indication as FDA approval for the off-
label use is required if the firms want to advertise directly to consumers.  Direct-to-consumer (DTC) 
advertising of prescription medications increases requests by patients for specific prescriptions, but there is 
a large gap between request and prescribing. While one survey found that approximately 35% of patients 
had discussed an advertised drug with their doctor, a 2002 GAO study reported that only 5% of consumers 
had both requested and received a prescription for a particular drug that had been the subject of DTC 
advertising.   Seithi, supra note 22; GAO, FDA Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Has 
Limitations (October 2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03177.pdf.   
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Practicing physicians, in fact, do not exert a high demand for convincing scientific 
proof of effectiveness for off-label uses. They do not create a robust market for 
scientifically valid information on effectiveness or even safety.23   
The conflicts-of-interest narrative of off-label prescribing implies that doctors’ 
prescribing is simply purchased by the pharmaceutical industry through free lunches, 
office supplies, travel, speaker’s fees, and other more extravagant gifts.24    While the 
“doctor for sale” story may be true as far as it goes,25 a fuller appreciation of physician 
prescribing behavior requires examining how physicians actually do learn to alter their 
practices, in this case to establish a new prescribing pattern for particular conditions.   
The literature on physician learning belies the common view of the practice of 
medicine as bounded by science.  In fact, one student of physician learning observed that 
doctors “have a deep skepticism about clinical trials, from a belief that clinical 
experience, rather than the scientific evidence should govern clinical practice.”26 High 
valuation of experience27 over studies permeates the observed learning patterns of 
                                                
23 Radley, supra note 1, at 1021.  
24 Troy Brennan, et al., A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians From Industry, 290 JAMA 252 
(2003); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry:  Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?,  283 
JAMA 373 (2000). 
25 See discussion of lack of outcomes research in the conflicts of interest literature supra note 5. 
26 Rebecca K. Schwartz et al., Physician Motivations for Nonscientific Drug Prescribing, 28 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 577 (1989), as quoted in Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard 
and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, at footnote 205 (2002). 
27Even physicians who report that they always or often use evidence-based medicine in making practice 
decisions rely instead most heavily on clinical experience.  Ninety-three percent of physicians in one study 
reported relying on clinical experience as an information source, and the rate of reliance did not differ 
substantially between the group reporting commitment to evidence-based medicine and the group that only 
sometimes or rarely/never utilized EBM in their practice.  Finlay A. McAlister, et al., Evidence-Based 
Medicine and the Practicing Clinician, 14 J. OF GEN. INT. MED. 236 (1999).  Reliance on clinical 
experience may be dangerous, of course.  A study of data on the impact of clinical experience, in terms of 
years of practice concluded that, in fact, experience may have an inverse impact on health outcomes, 
compliance with screening recommendations, and information base for prescribing.  Niteesh K. Choudhry, 
et al., Systematic Review:  The Relationship Between Clinical Experience and Quality of Health Care, 142 
ANNALS INT. MED. 260 (2005). 
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practicing physicians, including the surprisingly limited influence of published studies 
and the relative ineffectiveness of didactic continuing medical education.   
Peer-reviewed journals are the gold standard for the publication of rigorous 
medical and scientific research; and journal articles do exert some influence on specific 
treatment decisions, but not nearly as much as one might anticipate.  One researcher on 
physician decision making, for example, has noted that “the universal skepticism of 
practicing physicians regarding the utility of the scientific literature is startling.”28   
There is also evidence that even when physicians do review professional journals 
for relevant information for clinical decision making that they are likely to fail to 
distinguish between rigorous studies and preliminary studies;29 may be limited in their 
ability to assess the strength of any particular study;30 and may in fact rely excessively on 
abstracts, overlooking instances in which the abstract may overstate results.31  In 
addition, critics of peer-reviewed journals as a source of guidance for clinical decision 
making have noted that journals are not focused on the practitioner and often mix reports 
of a few rigorous trials with many preliminary studies, making it difficult for the 
practitioner (who may skip the methodology section) to be discriminating in evaluating 
                                                
28 Ann Lennarson Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of the Science:  The Diffusion of New 
Medical Technologies into Practice, 4 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 5, 9 (1988), as quoted 
in Noah, supra note 26 at footnote 205.  See also H.B. Slotnick, How Doctors Learn: Physicians’ Self-
directed Learning Episodes, 74 ACADEMIC MEDICINE, 1106, 1110 (1999) (When addressing specific, acute 
needs, doctors tend to rely on readily available literature and discussions with colleagues.  They are more 
likely to refer to medical journals for guidance in addressing general problems.) 
29 R.B. Haynes, Loose Connections Between Peer-Reviewed Clinical Journals and Clinical Practice, 113 
ANN. INT. MED. 724 (1990). 
30 Only 34% of physician respondents in one survey reported that they had confidence in their ability to 
evaluate the methodology of a study on their own, and only 46% felt capable of doing a literature search.  
McAlister, supra note 27. 
31 One study of how residents learn, for example, observed that even the “librarian residents,” a term used 
to describe those residents who reported reading as a source of information, were most likely to read only 
the abstracts and conclusions of articles.  Stefan Timmermans & Alison Angell, Evidence-Based Medicine, 
Clinical Uncertainty, and Learning to Doctor, 42 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 342, 345–47 (2001).  
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the quality of information.32  Physicians also may be equally influenced by letters and 
case reports published in journals, which can be merely anecdotal, as by sound scientific 
studies.33  The reliance on anecdotal, informal reports is consistent with observations of a 
higher trust level for clinical experience over clinical trials.   
Written clinical guidelines standing alone also have proven relatively ineffective 
in changing practice patterns.34  While the lack of influence for clinical guidelines may be 
attributed simply to physician resistance to “cookbook medicine,” the more intractable 
problem is the quality of most clinical guidelines.  For example, guidelines frequently 
produce only the most general guidance in part because of the dearth of clinical research 
required to ground more specific, and perhaps more influential, guidelines.35  Thus, 
guidelines often must rely extensively on “expert opinion” or consensus (a.k.a. 
committee) efforts rather than data.  Further, to the extent that specific guidelines rely on 
the aggregation of published research studies, they may simply incorporate biases in that 
literature.36 
Perhaps because of their trust of experience over controlled studies, doctors may tend 
to rely on opinions of respected peers and opinion leaders within the profession rather 
than on clinical studies or clinical guidelines standing alone. Deference to “group think” 
and to a hierarchy of opinion may be a learned pattern of decision making adopted in the 
                                                
32 Haynes, supra note 29. 
33 In one survey doctors reported both that they referred to “review articles” in journals (73%) but that they 
did not refer to “research studies” (55%).  McAlister, supra note 27.   
34 See, e.g., James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines and Policies:Can They Improve Emergency Department 
Pain Management?,  31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 783 (2005). 
35 See generally Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology:  Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in 
the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (2002), for an in-depth discussion of practice guidelines.  
See also Sean R. Tunis, et. al, Practical Clinical Trials:  Increasing the Value of Clinical Research for 
Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1625 (2003). 
36 Kleinke, supra note 22, at 36, detailing the impact of bias in the development of guidelines for the use of 
pharmaceuticals. 
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doctor’s experience of residency training where the opinion of the attending physician is 
revered as authoritative.37  Studies document significant influence of peer opinions on 
clinical decision making,38 although some studies conclude that the context for the 
transmission of opinions may make a difference in effect on practice.39   
Documentation of wide variations in medical practice patterns corroborates the 
reported reliance on peers and opinion leaders as these same studies on practice 
variations reveal practice homogeneity as well.40   One might expect that if physicians 
relied on scientific research results for medical decision making, neither the variations 
among regions nor the homogeneity within regions would be so pronounced.   
Journals are not the only tool for formal learning in medical practice, of course.  
Continuing medical education (CME) is so highly valued as a vehicle for updating 
clinical knowledge that it is a routine licensure requirement for practicing physicians and 
is often used as a rehabilitative mechanism in physician discipline.41  CME, however, is 
largely ineffective in achieving its ultimate goal of improving practice.42    
                                                
37 Timmermans, supra note 31, at 345–47. 
38 See, e.g., Jane M. Young, et al., Role for Opinion Leaders in Promoting Evidence-Based Surgery, 138 
ARCH. SURG. 785 (2003), reporting that 88% of surgeons surveyed agreed that they had colleagues who 
would be influential in altering their own practice, and 93.8% reported that clinical opinion leaders in 
surgery were very or somewhat likely to influence their practice patterns.  Surgeons reported that opinion 
leaders were more influential than clinical audits or clinical practice guidelines.  At the same time, 
however, surgeons in this survey reported that peer-reviewed surgical literature influenced their practice as 
well.    
39 At least one study indicates that the influence of opinion leaders varies along the same lines as the 
influence of continuing medical education described below.  A. Wadhwa, et al., A Qualitative Study of 
Interphysician Telephone Consultations:  Extending the Opinion Leader Theory, 25 J. CONTIN. EDUC. 
HEALTH PROF. 98 (2005). 
40 The classic studies on interregional variations and intraregional homogeneities in practice were done by 
John E. Wennberg.  See, e.g., Dealing with Medical Practice Variations:  A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 6 (1984).  See also K. McPherson, et al., Small-Area Variations in the Use of Common Surgical 
Procedures: An International Comparison of New England, England, and Norway, 21 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
307, 1310–1314 (1982).  The studies on interregional heterogeneity and local homogeneity of surgical 
practice may contradict survey data of surgeons’ self-reported higher reliance on peer-reviewed literature 
(94%) than on local colleagues (89.3%).  Id.  
41See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 2190; MO. REV. STAT. § 330.160.  See also David A. Davis, et al., 
Accuracy of Physician Self-Assessment Compared With Observed Measures of Competence:  A Systematic 
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A significant study analyzing empirical studies of the impact of CME on practice 
decision making concluded that studies consistently demonstrated that formal, didactic 
CME exerts only a weak effect on practice patterns.43  Lecture and case-based CMEs, 
which are the custom of the trade, can change information levels but do not change 
practice.  The authors of this article found that traditional didactic CME “has little or no 
role to play” in changing practice.44  A later analysis confirmed this conclusion and noted 
that such programs “have little or no beneficial effect in changing physician practice.”45  
Doctors absorb new information, but do not necessarily incorporate it into their decision 
making.  
Some CME pedagogies can effect change in practice.46  In particular, multiple 
contacts between instructor and student following a learn-work-learn sequence; 
information provided at the point of an expressed need to know; comparative information 
on the practice of other physicians; enabling materials that assist in interactions with 
patients (such as patient education sheets, reminders, and such); mailed materials 
followed up with personal phone calls; and proctoring and shadowing all show more 
                                                                                                                                              
Review, 296 JAMA 1094 (2006) (describing CME requirements of state medical licensure bodies, the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the specialty boards, and others). 
42 A recent review of the role of CME in improving physician practices concludes that physicians do not 
accurately assess their own learning needs and that efforts to improve physician competency through 
continuing education will need to develop other tools to do so.  Id. at 1094. 
43 David Davis, et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education, 282 JAMA 867 (1999).  The 
results of this study were confirmed by a later analysis reported in B.S. Bloom, Effects of Continuing 
Medical Education on Improving Clinical Care and Patient Health:  A Review of Systematic Reviews, 21 
INT’L J. TECHNOL. ASSESS. HEALTH CARE 380 (2005).  See also W. Sohn, et al., Efficacy of Educational 
Interventions Targeting Primary Care Providers’ Practice Behaviors:  An Overview of Published 
Systematic Reviews, 64 J. PUB. HEALTH DENT. 164 (2004). 
44 Davis, supra note 43, at 873.   
45 Bloom, supra note 43.   
46 A 2004 article, for example, reported that an “interactive, case-based, educational intervention . . . using 
a series of interactive case-based teleconferences” effected a change in prescribing for asthma even though 
clinical guidelines recommending such prescribing had been ineffective in changing practice in over ten 
years.  R.S. Davis, et al., Changing Physician Prescribing Patterns Through Problem-Based Learning, 93 
ANN. ALLERGY ASTHMA IMMUNOL. 237 (2004). See also Paul E. Mazmanian & David A. Davis, 
Continuing Medical Education and the Physician as a Learner, 288 JAMA 1057 (2002). 
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significant effects than the standard CME.47  Most CME, however, is the “standard 
CME,”48 while most pharmaceutical detailing (one-on-one representative-physician 
marketing) utilizes the very same pedagogical methods that have been documented as 
effective in changing practice in the CME context.  In fact, although survey data indicates 
that practicing physicians are skeptical about scientific studies, a Kaiser Family 
Foundation survey of doctors found that 74% thought information provided by drug 
representatives was useful and 81% believed that the information was at least somewhat 
accurate.49  Of course, this may be due to the “free lunch” that comes with the 
information,50 but it may also be due to the more effective pedagogical methods -- 
methods that are responsive to clinical practice -- used in this form of CME.  
Once established, or once learned, practice and prescribing patterns are hard to alter.  
Some studies of off-label prescribing reveal habitual patterns among a significant 
segment of physicians.51  Habit may persist even when serious safety concerns emerge.  
For example, while changes in drug labeling regarding warnings of  previously unknown, 
serious risks are often mailed or faxed directly to physicians, studies indicate that these 
                                                
47 Davis, supra note 43, at 870-871.  See also F. Daniel Duffy & Eric S. Holmboe,  Self-assessment in 
Lifelong Learning and Improving Performance in Practice, 296 JAMA 1137, 1138 (2006) (discussing the 
importance of self-identified learning needs as motivational tools for more effective CME). 
48 Bloom, supra note 43.   
49 Kaiser Family Foundation, National Survey of Physicians Part II:  Doctors and Prescription Drugs (2002) 
available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/20020415b-index.cfm. 
50 See, e.g., Troy Brennan, Health Industry Practices That Create a Conflict of Interest, 295 JAMA 429 
(2006); Dana Katz, All Gifts Large and Small, 3 AJOB 39 (2003); Wazana, supra note 24, reporting on 
studies that document increased prescribing associated with pharmaceutical gifts; a positive disposition 
toward drug representatives; an increase in physician requests to add a specific drug to the hospital’s or 
insurer’s formulary in association with gifting; and doctors’ inability to distinguish grounded from 
ungrounded claims.  These studies do not measure patient outcomes subsequent to prescribing changes, 
however.  Studies of the influence of pharmaceutical detailing do not analyze its impact on patient 
outcomes.  Wazana, supra note 24, at 378.  Furthermore, some studies recognize specific positive effects, 
including “improved ability to identify the treatment for complicated illnesses.”  Id. 
51See, e.g., Judith K. Hellerstein, The Demand for Post-Patent Prescription Pharmaceuticals (December 
1994). NBER Working Paper No. W4981. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=226580.  See also 
discussion of Neurontin prescribing patterns, infra, text accompanying notes 209-213.  
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mailings “do not result in changes in prescribing practice . . . that physicians frequently 
prescribed drugs in violation of warnings, including black box warnings.”52  Of course, 
part of the paradox in drug approval and post-marketing surveillance is evident in the 
case of black box warnings in which the particular medication is not removed from the 
market, but physicians are to be “cautious” in prescribing because of risks discovered 
post-approval.  There may be good reasons for a doctor to continue prescribing a drug 
with a black box warning because it is more effective for the particular patient and that 
gain in effectiveness outweighs the newly discovered risks.  Thus, continued prescribing 
of medication with a black box warning in a particular case may be evidence of 
inappropriate habitual prescribing, or it may be an exercise of appropriate medical 
judgment.53   
 Why are practicing doctors more likely to emulate their peers in their practice 
decisions, to look to physician opinion leaders, and to trust experience rather than to rely 
                                                
52 Jerry H. Gurwitz, Serious Adverse Drug Effects – Seeing the Trees Through the Forest, 354 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1413 (2006.)  Black box warnings are the most severe warnings the FDA can issue for a drug that is 
to remain on the market despite newly discovered adverse effects.  See also KE Lasser, Adherence to Black 
Box Warnings for Prescription Medications in Outpatients, 166 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 3, 338-
44 (2006) (reporting that doctors studied prescribed medications subject to black box warnings to 7 of 1000 
outpatients, with female patients and patients over 75 years old more likely to receive the medications; that 
fewer than 1% of patients who received such drugs had an adverse drug event; and that “few incidents 
resulted in detectable harm.”); AK Wagner, FDA Drug Prescribing Warnings: Is the Black Box Half Empty 
or Half Full?, 15 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY AND DRUG SAFETY 6, 369-86 (2006)(reporting that 40% of 
patients studied received a medication subject to a black box warning applicable to their situation, 
including some specifically applicable to pregnancy and that most of the non-compliance observed 
involved the absence of baseline laboratory monitoring that should have accompanied the drug therapy). 
53See e.g., American Medical Association, Report 10 on the Council of Scientific Affairs (A-05): Safety 
and Efficacy of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) in Children and Adolescents (2005) 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/15186.html:  “[The AMA] recognizes that the 
current product labeling (package insert) of antidepressant drugs, including the Black Box warnings, is a 
precautionary statement intended to reinforce the need for careful monitoring of patients with depression 
and other psychiatric disorders during the initiation of treatment.  This product labeling should not be 
interpreted in a way that would decrease access for patients who may benefit from these drugs.”  This 
became AMA policy H-115.971 Safety and Efficacy of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) in 
Children and Adolescents, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-115.971.HTM.  After reviewing the 
evidence, the AMA concluded that the association between the antidepressants and rates of suicide was not 
supported by data.  AMA asks FDA to Study Impact of Antidepressant Labeling Changes. AMA Science 
News.  Available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/15240.html.  
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on published scientific studies or formal FDA approval?  To some extent, physicians are 
simply employing common coping skills to manage the information environment of 
modern medical practice.  The amount of medical information available to a physician is 
overwhelming; for example, Medline adds 30,000 citations to its database each month.54  
Although Medline and other medical research databases are searchable, doctors report a 
low confidence level in their ability to do a literature search on a particular question.55 
Learning preferences and  information preferences are common coping tools for massive 
amounts of information.56  
Similarly, informal communication networks among peers can transmit 
information much more quickly than peer-reviewed journals can.57  Especially in certain 
practice areas, including oncology for example, the demand for speed may outpace the 
demand for scientific verification (for example, through completion of ongoing but 
incomplete clinical trials) of the quality of information that is being shared.58  
Furthermore, information gathered from peers comes with an interpretative framework of 
experience, which is valued in medicine.59 
We also see in these learning preferences a construct of patients as highly variable 
and medical practice as highly intuitive and reliant on judgment or discretion.  The 
averages produced in scientific studies will not necessarily account for the individual 
                                                
54 Noah, supra note 35, at 402-403. 
55 McAlister, supra note 27. 
56 Noah, supra note 35, at 402-403. 
57 Id. 
58 Klein, supra note 21, at 60.  
59 See supra notes 26-27. 
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patient presenting to the individual physician.  The problem of heterogeneity extends to 
individualized responses to medications.60 
Finally, in a tradition-oriented profession like medicine (like most professions), 
there is safety in the herd.  Malpractice and professional disciplinary standards, to the 
extent that they compare an individual doctor’s decisions to a national or community 
custom, reinforce this learning pattern by rewarding those who assure that their practice 
is within the mainstream.  In some instances, regulatory agencies have used departure 
from majority prescribing practices as indicia of criminal or licensure violations.61   
 The observed skepticism of scientific studies as essential supports for prescribing 
may reflect patterns of learning and practice that are simply resistant to scientific 
evidence no matter what the quality of information available.  Reliance on peers and peer 
practices may also respond to ineffective dissemination of knowledge through other 
outlets, including both journal articles and continuing medical education programs.  In 
addition to these considerations, deficiencies in the production and quality of clinical 
knowledge, which are discussed in the next section, may actually reinforce clinicians’ 
skepticism of the utility of research studies in their prescribing decisions.   
Part II:  The Limited Utility of Clinical Research for Off-Label Prescribing Decisions 
 If off-label uses of an approved medication are to be tested at all, those tests, by 
definition, will be conducted after the drug is approved for the market.  As discussed 
earlier, the FDA does not ordinarily require significant post-marketing clinical research 
as a condition of approval of a particular drug, even though it has some authority to do 
                                                
60 Heterogeneity is a particular problem in the responsiveness of patients to particular medications, both in 
terms of effectiveness and adverse effects.  Soumerai, supra note 22, at 143.  See also, EPSTEIN, supra note 
5, 118-120. 
61 See, e.g., Symposium:  Appropriate Management of Pain:  Addressing the Clinical, Legal, and 
Regulatory Barriers, 24 J.L. Med. & Ethics 285-364 (1996).  
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so.  Furthermore, prescribing doctors do not exert strong market demand for post-
marketing research for off-label prescribing.  Weak demand for post-marketing research, 
both through regulatory channels and in the prescribing market,62 has produced an 
insufficient supply of clinical knowledge for off-label prescribing.   This gap exists not 
only in the case of non-approved uses but also the perhaps even more common incidents 
of off-label prescribing relating to the use of approved medications for patient 
populations on which the drug has not been tested and where there may be significant 
disparities in effectiveness and safety (e.g., certain drugs tested only on men but 
prescribed for women and drugs tested only on adults but prescribed for children) and use 
of medications for doses or for durations (e.g., long-term instead of short-term) that have 
not been tested in clinical trials prior to approval.  
Off-label prescribing is not unique in raising the issue of insufficient clinical 
research.  The insufficiency in the production of Phase IV clinical trials extends to all 
prescribing, including both off-label prescribing and prescribing within the scope of 
approval.  These studies typically will be the first in which very large numbers of persons 
are studied.  For comparison, Phase III trials, the largest of the pre-approval trials, 
ordinarily involve only 1,000 to 3,000 people, a number that is too small to reveal 
uncommon though quite serious adverse effects.  In addition, the pre-approval trials are 
time-limited, while post-marketing trials can extend for a much longer time, again 
increasing the likelihood that adverse events that arise only with very long-term use will 
be detected.  In addition, pre-approval trials generally rely on a “naïve” subject 
population, one that will not present the risk of drug interactions because these 
interactions may confound the results for the tested drug.  Once available for prescribing, 
                                                
62 See Part II supra. 
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however, the approved drug will be used by patients taking any number of other 
medications; and so, Phase IV trials often present the first opportunity for testing the risks 
of drug interactions.  Equally importantly, approved medications are prescribed for 
individuals, including both the elderly and children as well as individuals with medical 
conditions such as diabetes, in whom the medication may behave quite differently in 
terms both of effect and safety. These differences are likely to be detected only in the 
postmarketing phase of research.63  Finally, the FDA does not require proof of 
comparative efficacy for approval of a new medication, and so trials that compare one 
drug to another usually take place, if at all, only after a new medication has been 
approved.64   
The insufficiency in clinical trials occurs both in terms of the volume of this 
research as well as in its quality.  Understanding the sources of inadequacies in 
contemporary clinical research for the needs of clinical practice emerges from an 
examination of the funding for clinical research (and the presumed impact of that 
funding) as well as limitations in the design of clinical trials. 
Randomized clinical trials are expensive.  In fact, the larger number of subjects 
and longer lifespan of Phase IV trials make them particularly expensive.  The 
pharmaceutical industry is not the only source of financing for post-marketing clinical 
                                                
63 DeMonaco, supra note 4. 
64 Those comparative studies currently conducted can suffer from design flaws relating to whether the 
appropriate dosage is chosen for the comparable and other issues.  K.J. Jørgensen, et al., Flaws in Design, 
Analysis and Interpretation of Pfizer's Antifungal Trials of Voriconazole and Uncritical Subsequent 
Quotations, 7 TRIALS 3 (2006);  V. Frighi, Medical Journals, Academia, and Industry-Sponsored Clinical 
Trials,  2 PLOS MED.7, e218 (2005);  J. Lexchin, et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and 
Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRITISH MED. J. 7400, 1167 (2003), available at 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?tool=pmcentrez&blobtype=pdf&artid=156458 
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research; it’s just the biggest by far.65  The federal National Institutes of Health (NIH) has 
been expanding its commitment to clinical research of late, but currently spends only 
30% of its budget (approximately $850 million) on pharmaceutical clinical trials of all 
types, including Phase I, II, III as well as Phase IV trials.66 The federal Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) spends approximately $30 million annually on 
clinical trials, although again not only Phase IV trials.67 The Veterans’ Administration 
has conducted some significant trials of medical interventions, but its budget for such 
research is only approximately $55 million per year, and again not devoted entirely to 
pharmaceutical research.68  The Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics, a 
joint FDA-AHRQ effort aimed at improving the production of clinical knowledge, has an 
annual budget of $7 million to support clinical trials of drugs.69 The Medicare program 
has also begun to “fund” clinical research studies on its own beneficiaries through a 
condition on payment for “experimental” interventions.70  In comparison to the 
approximately $950 million of federal money devoted to all phases of clinical trials, 
pharmaceutical firms spend $4.1 billion on such research, over four times the government 
expenditure.  Of that, about $410 million is spent on Phase IV trials alone.71  While 
private insurers and pharmacy benefits management programs are beginning an effort to 
                                                
65 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 145, analyzing data on marketing expenditures and relating those to clinical 
trial expenditures. 
66 D.G. Nathan & H.E. Varmus, The National Institutes of Health and Clinical Research:  A Progress 
Report, 6 NAT’L MED. 1201 (2000).  
67 Tunis, supra note 35 1628. 
68 Id. 
69 AHRQ, Center for Education and Research on Therapeutics, available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/certsovr.pdf. 
70 Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Coverage Determinations with Data Collection as a 
Condition of Coverage:  Coverage with Evidence Development (2006).  See also, Sandra J. Carnahan, 
Medicare’s Coverage with Study Participation Policy:  Clinical Trials or Tribulations, YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS, forthcoming.  See also, discussion of data collection by private insurers, supra note 8. 
71K. Getz & S. Zisson, Clinical Grants Market Decelerates, 10 CENTERWATCH 4 (2003).  The 
pharmaceutical industry spends more than $38 billion annually on research and development generally.  
Nicholas Bakalar, Review Finds Drug Makers Issue More Positive Studies, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007.    
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produce clinical research on approved drugs, this effort is in its infancy and currently is 
confined largely to collecting data from the pharmaceutical industry itself.72  Even if this 
effort increases, the information produced may be viewed as proprietary. 
 Pharmaceutical industry support for research, so essential to the production of 
clinical knowledge in the face of limited public funding, has raised substantial concerns, 
as described in Part I of this article.  The interesting, vigorous and disturbing debate over 
industry support of clinical trials challenges the credibility of clinical research on which 
clinical, management, and regulatory decisions, at least theoretically, should rely.   
Furthermore, the current credibility crisis may have a nonspecific but pervasive effect on 
the uptake of clinical research results into medical practice, especially when fed into a 
model of physician learning and decision making that is already skeptical of the 
usefulness of scientific studies.73  Finally, the quality of clinical research certainly limits 
its utility for regulatory and private controls over physician prescribing.   If clinical 
studies are biased, then public and private efforts to control prescribing rely on defective 
information.74   
In January 2003, Bekelman and colleagues published a watershed article on the 
impact of funding source on results of research.75  In this article, they performed a meta-
                                                
72 See, e.g., Peter J. Neumann, Evidence-Based and Value-Based Formulary Guidelines, 23 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 124 (2004).  Interestingly, the Neurontin settlement, discussed in Part IV, is providing grants to 
organizations to study prescribing patterns and provide education to doctors and consumers concerning 
sources of information for prescription drugs.  Attorney General Myers, Kitzhaber Address “1st of Its Kind” 
Conference in Portland, U.S. State News, Dec. 4, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 20971720; Kaiser 
Permanente Receives Research Grant to Study Medication Prescribing Practices,  DRUG WEEK, May, 19, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 8114182.    
73 See supra notes 26 and 28.           
74 See infra text accompanying note 86. 
75 Justin E. Bekelman, et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A 
Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454 (2003). See also,  James F. Fries and Eswar Krishnan, Equipoise, 
Design Bias, and Randomized Controlled Trials: The Elusive Ethics of New Drug Development, 6 
ARTHRITIS RESEARCH & THERAPY 3, R250–R255 (2004), available at 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?tool=pubmed&pubmedid=15142271; Mohit 
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analysis of 37 published quantitative studies that compared the source of funding with the 
outcomes of 1140 biomedical studies, many of which were drug studies.76  Bekelman’s 
study thus examined the aggregation of data over several studies of single drugs or other 
medical interventions.77  Bekelman and colleagues concluded that the sponsorship of a 
study was very closely associated with the outcome reported, even in the case of random 
controlled trials.  The authors concluded that:  
Strong and consistent evidence shows that industry-sponsored research  
tends to draw pro-industry conclusions. . . .  [W]e found that industry- 
sponsored studies were significantly more likely to reach conclusions  
that were favorable to the sponsor than were nonindustry studies.78  
 
The pattern of “pro-industry conclusions,” as the authors termed the phenomenon, was 
pronounced in several instances.79  For example, studies of the results of articles on 
calcium channel blockers reported that 51% of authors with industry funding reported 
positive results in trials of the drugs, while 0% of authors of studies that were not 
sponsored by interested firms reported positive results.80  Other studies showed less 
dramatic differences, but a difference of 20% was most common when comparing the 
rate of positive and negative outcomes over the aggregated studies of particular drugs or 
other interventions.81   
 It is indicative of this time of turmoil in clinical research that it’s not clear where 
the blame lies for the observed bias in studies reviewed, accepted, and published in 
medical journals.  Does the association of sponsorship with positive results reflect bias on 
                                                                                                                                              
Bhandari, et al., Association Between Industry Funding and Statistically Significant Pro-Industry Findings 
in Medical and Surgical Randomized Trials,  170 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 4, 477–480; Lexchin, supra note 
64.  
76 See Bekelman, supra note 75, at 456. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 463. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 456. 
81 Id. at 458. 
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the part of the industry-funded researcher, influencing the researcher’s collection and 
analysis of data?82  Or, is the bias the result of the pharmaceutical firms’ selectivity in 
choosing to fund only studies with a high likelihood of positive outcome, thereby 
strengthening the market for their product?83  Or, is the observed bias in the literature 
produced by research contracts or grants in which the sponsor retains the unilateral right 
to release results for publication or not, allowing the sponsor to control the flow of 
information through the journals to the medical market?84  Or, is it possible that the 
journals themselves contribute to selection bias by rejecting studies that “show that a new 
treatment is inferior to standard treatment” or “that are neither clearly positive nor clearly 
negative.”85 
Of course, any one of these reasons casts doubt on the reliability not only of a 
single published article, but even more significantly on the entire body of published 
                                                
82  The Bekelman article considers several factors contributing to disproportionately positive results, but 
does not list individual researcher bias among those.  Bekelman, supra, note 75, at 464.  But see, Catherine 
D. DeAngelis, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 296 JAMA 996, 996 (2006), considering this 
possibility. 
83 See e.g.,  Fries, supra note 75.  The authors argue that “extensive preliminary data are used to design 
[industry-funded] studies with a high likelihood of being positive;” and further report that company 
consultants and staff review what is known about the drug, its competitors, its potential advantages in terms 
of toxicity or efficacy, and the potential disease indications and then design trials that include the patients, 
dosages, study duration, end-points, and comparables that are likely to provide a positive result for the 
sponsor and one that is acceptable to the F.D.A.  
84 In a 1986 survey of research faculty, 24% of those funded by industry reported restrictions on publication 
of study results compared to 5% of those with other funding for research.  D. Blumenthal, et al., University-
Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology:  Implications for the University, 232 SCIENCE 1361 
(1986); See also Richard Smith, Medical Journals Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of 
Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 PLoS Med 5,  e138 (2005), available at 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1140949, reporting suppression of results is 
“too crude” a method for influencing the body of published work and reviewing other methods that can 
achieve the same effect.  In fact, Bekelman, et al., report that suppression of data is less likely in industry 
sponsored studies than in studies in which the researcher is “in the process of bringing their research results 
to market.” Bekelman, supra, note 75, at 463.  See discussion of Bayh-Dole infra, text at notes 134-137. 
85 Editorial, Clinical Trial Registration:  A Statement from the International Committee of Medical Journal 
Editors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250 (2004).  See also J.D. Kleinke, supra note 22, at 35-36, 
discussing the tendency of journals toward publishing articles that expand the use of more aggressive and 
more expensive drug therapies; Smith, supra note 84, describing a strategy of publishing the results of 
multi-center trials in a number of publications as separate results to produce a body of research that shows a 
high frequency of positive results, a strategy that directly benefits publishers of medical journals as well as 
the manufacturer. 
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research about a particular drug.  Systemic bias has serious implications for the 
aggregation of published results.  Such aggregation of results is often the foundation for 
the “evidence” for evidence-based medicine – for practice guidelines and consensus 
statements for treatment decisions.86 If published results, in the aggregate, show a bias 
toward “pro-industry” conclusions, the disutility of published clinical trials becomes 
apparent, raising issues not only for the practicing physician but also for any gatekeeper, 
governmental or private, that aims at controlling individual prescribing decisions by 
reference to published clinical studies.   
The Bekelman piece is only an example of the mounting concern over bias in 
published clinical studies.  In the four years since this watershed analysis, the trickle of 
concern over the validity and purity of research results published in the gold standard 
peer-reviewed journals has grown into a torrent.87  In a summer 2006, editorial, Dr. 
Catherine DeAngelis, the editor-in-chief of  JAMA, identifies a litany of examples of 
                                                
86The aggregation of study results is filtered through expert opinion in the development of clinical practice 
guidelines; however, a study of experts involved in the development of published practice guidelines or 
consensus statements found that 87% had financial connections to pharmaceutical firms.  Niteesh 
Choudhry, et al., Relationships Between Authors of Clinical Practice Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 287 JAMA 612 (2002).   Of course, these relationships may have no effect on the content of the 
guidelines.  See supra note 4.  See also David G. Duvall, Conflict of Interest or Ideological Divide, 
CURRENT. MED. RES. & OPINION, Sept. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 18371153.  The use of expert 
opinion in the development of guidelines also illustrates the reliance on peer and leader opinions in medical 
decisionmaking.  See discussion supra text accompanying notes 26, 25, 37-40, 54-59, 61. 
87 While the discussion that follows focuses on the issues arising in the publication of clinical studies, 
research centers have established policies to manage conflicts of interest in the conduct of research.  For 
example, the American Association of Medical Colleges has recommended that medical research 
universities establish conflict-of-interest policies.  Jordan Cohen, AAMC Urges Speedy Adoption of NIH 
Conflict of Interest Reforms (2004), available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2004 
/040506.htm; United States General Accounting Office, University Research: Most Federal Agencies Need 
to Protect against Financial Conflicts of Interest.  Report to the Honorable Richard C. Shelby, U.S. Senate, 
(Issued November 2003), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content_storage_01/0000000b/80/2b/f3/c2.pdf.  
(reporting that all of the 171 universities surveyed had conflicts-of-interest policies for their researchers and 
that 87% of research universities had policies that complied with NIH and NSF guidelines.);  Harrington, 
Peter J, Faculty Conflicts of Interest in an Age of Academic Entrepreneurialism: An Analysis of the 
Problem, the Law and Selected University Policies, 27 J. C. & U. L. 775 (2001).  See also, infra, text 
accompanying notes 165-169 for discussion of governmental policies on conflicts of interest. 
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“research irregularities” in research sponsored by “for-profit companies.”88  These 
examples include “refusal to provide all study data to the study team, reporting only 6 
months of data in a trial designed to have 12 months of data . . .; incomplete reporting of 
serious adverse events; and concealing clinical trial data showing harm.”89  She further 
details her concerns that industry sponsorship of clinical studies can “exert inappropriate 
influence in research via control of study data and statistical analysis, ghostwriting, 
managing all or most aspects of manuscript preparation, and dictating to investigators the 
journals to which they should submit their manuscripts,” noting that some companies are 
rumored to be preventing researchers from publishing in JAMA because of its conflicts-
of-interest requirements.90   DeAngelis’ concerns are shared by many,91 and the behaviors 
she identifies are well documented.92  In addition to JAMA’s adventures, the New 
England Journal of Medicine dealt with its own controversy with industry-supported 
research when it published notices stating that they believed that Merck intentionally 
altered the evidence in clinical trials of Vioxx the results of which were published in the 
Journal.93   
                                                
88DeAngelis, supra  note 82.   
89 Id. at 996. 
90 Id. 
91 The most prominent critique of the pharmaceutical industry, including their research efforts, is another 
medical journal editor Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, author of The 
Truth About Drug Companies:  How They Deceive Us and What do About It (2004).   
92 See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance:  Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539 (2000) (documenting ghostwriting); See also, U.S. ex rel. 
McDermott v. Genentech, 2006 WL 3741920 at 3 (D. Maine 2006) (concerning alleged ghostwriting). 
93Gregory D. Curfman, et al., Expression of Concern Reaffirmed, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193 (2006).  See 
also Claire Bombardier, et al., Correspondence, Response to Expression of Concern Regarding VIGOR 
Study, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1196 (2006).  See also, The Lancet Editors, Vioxx:  An Unequal Partnership 
Between Safety and Efficacy, 364 THE LANCET 1287 (2004) (noting that “the real picture of cardiovascular 
risk has been apparent for some time and Merck's vigorous defence of this drug in the past was clearly an 
error” and that “the Vioxx story is one of blindly aggressive marketing by Merck mixed with repeated 
episodes of complacency by drug regulators.”); Editorial, Vioxx, The Implosion of Merck, and Aftershocks 
at the FDA, 364 THE LANCET 1995 (2004).   
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Conflicts-of-interest analysis, which has framed the debate over industry funding 
of clinical trials, can go only so far in responding to the crisis in the reliability, real or 
perceived, of clinical research.94  As most critics acknowledge, pharmaceutical industry 
support for clinical research has significant benefits, and it is highly unrealistic to think 
that patients would be better off without it.95   Furthermore, conflicts-of-interest 
regulation has limited usefulness as a tool for controlling for the impact of funding on the 
quality of clinical research.  
JAMA’s own response to the credibility crisis illustrates some of the limitations 
of the conflicts-of-interest response to perceived deficiencies in clinical research.  JAMA, 
like other medical journals,96 has instituted several policies to handle financial conflicts 
of interest related to articles submitted for publication.97  Among those, the requirement 
of author disclosure of financial interests and the requirement of independent data 
analysis for industry-supported studies illustrate important points in the limitations of 
                                                
94 Conflicts of interests in research raise other issues, of course, including concerns over the protection of 
human subjects either because of misunderstandings or miscommunication of the purpose of the 
intervention or because of enrollment pressures.  See, e.g.,  Kevin W. Williams, Managing Physician 
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials Conducted in the Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & 
DRUG (2004). 
95 Brennan, supra note 24; DeAngelis, supra note 82.   
96 JAMA is a member of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, which has established 
conflict-of-interest policies that each member Journal agrees to enforce.  Members of ICMJE include the 
New England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet, Annals of Internal Medicine, and others.  See 
http://www.icmje.org/ (last visited October 8, 2006). 
97 For example, journal members of the ICMJE, including JAMA, in response to episodes of suppression of 
the results of studies, require that clinical trials be posted in a “public trials registry” as a condition of 
submission for publication.  Editorial, supra note 84.  One of the most highly publicized instances of 
alleged suppression of study results indicating that the use of Paxil for adolescents suffering from 
depression may increase suicide rates for that population.  Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, 
sued GlaxoSmithKline for its actions in regard to Paxil.  As part of the settlement of the litigation, GSK 
agreed to establish a clinical trials registry on which it would post summaries of all clinical studies within 
10 months of the completion of the study.  At the same time, several other pharmaceutical companies 
established similar sites.  GSK Will Disclose Clinical Trial Data, Settles Case Brought by New York AG, 13 
Health Law Reporter 1290 (September 2, 2004).  In a settlement just a few days later, Forest Laboratories 
agreed to establish a registry on which it would list its ongoing clinical trials as well as the results of 
completed trials.  Forest Laboratories to Create Registry Summarizing Clinical Trials of its Products, 13 
Health Law Reporter 1325 (September 16, 2004). 
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current responses to financial conflicts of interest in the production of clinical 
knowledge.98  
JAMA requires that authors disclose financial conflicts of interest related to the 
research reported in their submitted article.  JAMA began requesting disclosure by 
authors in 1985;99 made disclosure mandatory in 1989;100 began publishing author 
disclosures in 1990;101 and strengthened its disclosure requirements in 2006,102 in 
response to concerns about author non-compliance with the Journal’s prior disclosure 
requirements.103    
The purpose of publishing financial relationship disclosures, according to the 
Journal’s editor in chief, is “so that readers can interpret the article in light of that 
information.”104  It is not clear exactly how the reader, even the medically-trained reader, 
is to take the disclosed conflict into account in evaluating whether the article should 
influence prescribing decisions, however. 
A quick look at recent issues of JAMA provides a launching point for a discussion 
of how a reader should account for a disclosed relationship between researcher and 
sponsor in evaluating the article as a source of information to incorporate in practice.  In 
a selection of JAMA issues published in 2005 through the August 2, 2006 issue (selecting 
every fourth issue published), at least one of the authors for approximately one-third (35 
of 106) of articles categorized by the Journal as “Original Contributions” (31 of 90) or 
                                                
98 Editorial, supra note 85.   
99 E. Knoll & George D. Lundberg, New Instructions for JAMA Authors, 254 JAMA 97 (1985). 
100 George D. Lundberg & Annette Flanagin, New Requirements for Authors:  Signed Statements of 
Authorship Responsibility and Financial Disclosure, 262 JAMA 2003 (1989). 
101 DeAngelis, supra note 82 at 997.   
102 Annette Flanagin, Update on JAMA’s Conflict of Interest Policy, 296 JAMA 220 (2006). 
103 DeAngelis, supra note 82 at 997.  
104 Id. at 997. 
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“Reviews” (4 of 16) disclosed financial relationships.105  Four of the thirty-five instances 
of reported relevant financial relationships were by authors of Reviews; i.e., meta-
analyses of previously published studies.  Reviews are among the most influential articles 
in medical journals.106   Because “the essence of reviews and editorials is selection and 
interpretation of the literature,” the New England Journal of Medicine refuses to publish 
reviews by authors who have a “significant” financial interest relevant to the subject 
matter of the review, although NEJM had to relax its prohibition in 2002 because of its 
inability to secure reviews of drug therapies under the former standards.107 
Five of the twelve Reviews in JAMA for which no author made a financial 
disclosure involved review of an issue for which there is no apparent pharmaceutical 
connection in treatment or diagnosis while seven Reviews addressed issues with obvious 
implication for drug therapies or diagnosis.  All four of the Reviews written by authors 
who disclosed financial relationships, however, reviewed pharmaceutical interventions.  
Thus, of the seven Reviews with apparent pharmaceutical subject matter, more than 50% 
were written by authors with disclosable financial relationships.  These numbers may 
actually under-report the proportion of JAMA articles written by authors with relevant 
                                                
105 It is likely, however, that more authors than actually disclosed such relationships had financial dealings 
with sponsors that would be covered by the JAMA disclosure requirement.  In July 2006, several incidents 
in which articles of published articles failed to disclose relationships as required by the Journal’s policy 
came to light.  See DeAngelis, supra note 82.   
106 In one study, 73% of physician respondents reported that they used review articles as an information 
source.  These review articles may be attractive to physicians because they digest a number of articles.  In 
the same survey, only 34% of respondent physicians believed that they were able to evaluate the 
methodology of a study on their own and only 46% felt capable of doing a literature search.  McAlister, 
supra note 27.   
107 Editorial, Financial Associations of Authors, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. L.J. 1901 (2002), observing that the 
Journal had been able to secure only one review article on novel drug therapy over the course of two years 
under its former prohibition of any financial interest on the part of review authors. 
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financial interests as there have been some reports of authors failing to disclose required 
information.108 
The editor of JAMA, in an editorial published in the Journal describing 
implementation of the Journal’s disclosure policy, argues that all articles in JAMA have 
passed “rigorous peer review and careful editorial evaluation.”109  She goes on to say that 
the fact that authors of several articles published by JAMA in early 2006 failed to 
disclose required information “does not automatically translate to the article being 
flawed.”110  Still, “[f]or disclosure to be effective, the recipient of the advice must 
understand how the conflict of interest has influenced the advisor and must be able to 
correct for that biasing influence.”111 
So, how should the practicing physician, or practice guidelines development 
panel, take the disclosed financial support into account and “correct for that biasing 
influence”?  If JAMA, applying its “rigorous peer review” process, and knowing of the 
financial interests of the author and the source of sponsorship, has published an article, 
what more would the individual practicing physician be able to bring to the critique of the 
research?  If the practicing physician is simply to be “skeptical,” the advice confirms the 
pattern of skepticism about scientific journals discussed earlier.112 If that pattern of 
skepticism is to be encouraged, then on what should the physician rely in deciding to 
prescribe medications off-label?  Experience?  Intuition?  Peer opinion leaders?  
Enlarging the scope just a bit, how should consensus or practice guidelines panels treat 
the one-third of JAMA articles that are written by authors with financial self-interest?  
                                                
108 DeAngelis, supra note 82 at 997.  
109 Id. 
110 Id.   
111 Daylian Cain, et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean:  Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2005).  See supra notes 26 and 28. 
112 See supra notes 26 and 28. 
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These articles can hardly be eliminated entirely from consideration because they are 
likely to be the only source of peer-reviewed data and because they may in fact be valid.   
Disclosure does not itself remedy concerns with the quality of clinical 
information.  Nor has disclosure of conflicts of interest in medicine produced the desired 
response in the clinical context.  The process of disclosing financial conflicts of interest 
may encourage the physician to grant himself or herself a “moral license” to behave 
differently once the disclosure has been made.113  In addition, disclosure of conflicts of 
interest by the doctor in a therapeutic relationship may actually increase the patient’s trust 
level rather than putting them on guard.114  The doctor-reader may behave differently 
than patients in this regard, however, as doctors tend to believe that they themselves are 
not influenced by their financial interests but that other doctors may be.115   
In an additional response to financial conflicts of interest in research, JAMA has 
established a special rule for independent statistical analysis for industry-sponsored 
studies.  In 2005, JAMA established a policy requiring that the authors of industry-
sponsored studies in which data analysis was done “solely by statisticians employed by 
the company sponsoring the research” submit an “independent analysis of the data . . . 
conducted by statisticians at an academic institution, such as a medical school, academic 
medical center, or government research institute” as a condition for consideration for 
publication.116  The preference for biostatisticians working at “academic” institutions  
works from an assumption that the place in which the evaluation is conducted makes a 
difference.  Furthermore, independent, external data analysis is not required of studies 
                                                
113 Cain, supra 111, at 7. 
114 Id. at 5. 
115 Jason Dana, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians From Industry, 290 JAMA 252 (2003).  
116 Phil B. Fontanarosa, et al., Reporting Conflicts of Interest, Financial Aspects of Research, and Role of 
Sponsors in Funded Studies, 294 JAMA 110, 111 (2005).   
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conducted and analyzed in academic institutions working under contract (through a 
research grant funding the study) with a for-profit industry sponsor.  By implication, 
industry sponsorship is less dangerous when the academy is industry’s partner.   
In fact, a great deal of clinical research has moved out of the academic medical 
centers and into contract research organizations (CROs)117 and private physician offices.  
Although estimates of the magnitude of the shift from academic medical centers (AMCs) 
to private physician offices or CROs vary, all agree that there has been a landslide in that 
direction and that it continues to grow.  Only 40% of the funding of clinical trials is 
currently being placed with academic medical centers; and 60% is being placed with 
private practices, a three-fold increase in ten years.  Fewer than half of researchers work 
in academic medical centers, representing an 80% decrease over ten years.118  The 
number of physicians in private practice who were engaged in protocols tripled to nearly 
12,000 physicians between 1990 and 1995.119    Estimates of CRO participation in 
pharmaceutical research report an annual growth rate of approximately 20% between 
1995 and 2000.120 
                                                
117 Contract Research Organizations (CROs) are free-standing, typically for-profit companies that provide 
research services under contract with pharmaceutical companies as well as government and other groups 
engaged in clinical research.  The CROs conduct basic research and clinical trials and also provide other 
services, including data and safety monitoring services, for researchers.  Coleman, et al., The Ethics and 
Regulation of Research with Human Subjects, 78 (2005).  CRO services may also include regulatory 
compliance support, quality control, and support for marketing.  Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of 
Clinical Research, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 129, 137-138 (2000). CROs also contract with site management 
service providers to assist doctors in private practice in recruiting patients for research protocols.  K. Morin, 
et al., Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78-84 (2002). 
118 Jason E. Klein and Alan R. Fleischmann, The Private Practicing Physician Investigator:  Ethical 
Implications of Clinical Research in the Office Setting, 32 HASTINGS CTR. REPT. 22, 22 (2002).  See also 
Office of Inspector General, supra note, at 12; K. Morin, supra note 117. 
119 M. Hovde & R. Seskin, Selecting U.S. Clinical Investigators, APPLIED CLIN. TRIALS, 34-42. (Feb. 
1997). 
120 Rettig, supra note 117. 
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Research has become a profit center for the physician in private practice.121  The 
sponsor typically pays the doctor in private practice a fee of $2000 to $7000 per patient 
enrolled, sometimes with little required beyond the collection of minimal data.122  
Enrollment payments by NIH for research in AMCs generally have been somewhat 
lower.123  According to a 2000 OIG study, doctors in private practice engaged in 
industry-funded studies also tend to receive additional compensation from sponsors in 
terms of consulting fees, speakers’ bureaus, and advisory panels.124   
It is likely that this trend of moving clinical trials away from academic medical 
centers and out to private practices will continue.  Post-marketing clinical trials require 
very large numbers of patients, and these numbers might be captured more quickly by 
paying many private physicians to recruit their own patients rather than by paying an 
academic researcher to try to recruit individuals from the general population or from 
teaching hospitals.125 Some sponsors believe that the practicing physician researchers and 
the contract research organizations will be able to complete clinical trials more quickly 
than will an academic medical center because of additional administrative requirements 
often found in universities.126  Others have argued that the most effective and informative 
clinical trials must be conducted in a great number of physician offices with a wide range 
of patients and practitioners with varying skill levels if they are to be useful for medical 
                                                
121 Payment for enrollment of patients in clinical trials can substantially exceed the amounts paid by payers 
for treating those patients.  K. Morin, supra note 117 at 81. 
122 K. Morin, supra note 117 at 78-84. 
123 NIH studies typically pay approximately $1,000 per enrollee.  Id. at 81. 
124 Office of Inspector General, supra note 6 at 16. 
125 Id. at 13.  See also Department of Health and Human Services, Financial Relationships and Interests in 
Research Involving Human Subjects:  Guidance for Human Subject Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 26393 at 
26394 (2004).  
126 For discussion of the perceived advantages of conducting clinical trials in private physician offices, see 
Kevin Williams, Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials Conducted in the 
Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 62-63 (2004). 
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decision making.127  Finally, as is discussed in Part III of this article, funding post-
approval studies in private medical offices may serve other non-research marketing 
interests for the pharmaceutical firms as well.128 
 The JAMA policy requiring university or government analyses of data implies 
that the academic medical center provides a greater defense against industry behavior that 
undermines the reliability of clinical studies.129  The interests of the academic clinician 
researcher and the academic medical center, it is thought, will militate against acceptance 
of publication agreements that allow the sponsor to suppress or permit publication of 
results; will more likely demand valid research design; and will be more likely to produce 
accurate data and reliable statistical analyses and interpretation. There may have been an 
assumption, for example, that academic researchers would be particularly sensitive to 
financial conflicts of interest.  In fact, however, compliance with JAMA’s relatively 
benign disclosure requirements has proven spotty among academic researchers at very 
well-respected research universities.130  Beyond questions of character or 
understanding131 that might lie beneath these individual instances of noncompliance, 
contemporary circumstances challenge the assumed singularity of interests for the 
academic research endeavor.   
                                                
127 Tunis, supra note 35 at 1627.  See supra note 65 and infra text accompanying notes 201-203.  
128 See supra note 65 and infra text accompanying notes 201-203.  
129 See generally, Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research:  IRB 
Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & 
ETHICS 379 (2000).   
130  DeAngelis, supra note 82.   
131 Studies consistently demonstrate that physicians and researchers believe themselves to be “impervious 
to industry influence” despite the literature that indicates that gifts trigger an “unconscious and 
unintentional” sense of obligation.  See, e.g., David Henry, et al., Ties That Bind: Multiple Relationships 
Between Clinical Researchers and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 165 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2493, 2495 
(2005).  
 37
Elite research universities and their medical centers rely primarily on NIH 
funding to support their research efforts; but even in these institutions, industry-funded 
research provides opportunities to grow the discretionary budget by providing a margin 
that remains in the control of the department or the researcher rather than the university 
fisc.132  AMCs other than the research elite may be losing the competition for the now 
shrinking NIH research dollar; and for these academic institutions, pharmaceutical 
research contracts are filling the gap.133   
In addition, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,134 which unleashed the entrepreneurial 
spirit of academic researchers and their employers with the goal of expediting the transfer 
of academic research to the market, significantly altered the interests of these researchers 
and universities.135  In a 2000 study, 124 of 183 institutions that were members of the 
Association of University Technology Managers reported that they held equity interests 
in businesses engaged in research at the university.136 Start-up companies, like those 
                                                
132 A 1996 study of the 50 universities receiving the highest level of NIH funding reported that 28% of their 
faculty received industry funding for research.  D. Blumenthal, et al., Participation of Life-Science Faculty 
in Research Relationships with Industry, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1734 (1996).  More recent data reports that 
industry funds for research in universities increased by 875% between 1980 and 2000.  Elite universities 
have experienced significant increases.  For example, industry funding contributes 31% of the overall 
budget at Duke University.  The University of Texas reported an increase in private funding of 735%, and 
the University of California at San Francisco, 491%.  Trudo Lemmons, Leopards in the Temple:  Restoring 
Scientific Integrity to the Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641 (2004), relying on 
SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST:  HAS THE LURE OF PROFIT CORRUPTED 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (Rowman & Littlefield) (2003). 
133 Reliance on industry funding is not confined to U.S. universities alone.  Between 2002 and 2004, for 
example, industry funding to McMaster University in Canada reportedly nearly quadrupled from $34 
million to nearly $129 million.  In addition, 15.5% of the full-time faculty had “financial connections” to 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms.  At the same time, pharmaceutical funding for research at the 
University of Toronto, one of the elite research universities in Canada, declined to less than 10% of the 
University’s total research funding. See Steve Buist, et al., Risks, Rewards & Research, HAMILTON 
SPECTATOR, June, 25, 2005.  
134 Bayh-Dohl Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980). 
135 See Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike:  Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions 
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393 (2006); Clovia Hamilton, University Technology 
Transfer and Economic Development:  Proposed Cooperative Economic Development Under the Bayh-
Dole Act, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397 (2003). 
136 L. Pressman.  AUTM Licensing Suvey, FY 1999:  Survey Summary.  Northbrook, Ill:  Association of 
University Technology Managers, 2000. 
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stimulated by Bayh-Dole and often jointly owned by research faculty and their 
university-employers, in fact have been associated with delays in publication of study 
results and resistance to sharing results,137 mirroring the issues concerning sponsor 
control of research discussed above.  At a minimum, rules applicable to “industry” should 
not be restricted only to large, for-profit pharmaceutical firms, but should also consider 
the smaller start-ups owned by research faculty and the universities themselves.   
Moreover, the narrow target of the JAMA policy exemplifies another attempt to make the 
challenge to clinical research more manageable by drawing boundaries that lack a 
grounding in reality. 
Industry influence is not the only quality issue affecting the utility of clinical trials 
for prescribing decisions.  Critics of the current state of clinical research focus on faults 
in the selection and design of studies that have little or nothing to do with industry 
sponsorship and conflicts of interest.   For example, current studies of health outcomes in 
clinical trials frequently suffer from two forms of design flaws.  First, many clinical 
studies rely on observation and self-reporting as the primary tool for evaluating 
effectiveness.  Although these tools are unavoidable in some circumstances such as 
studies evaluating the effectiveness of pain medication, they tend to suffer from bias.138  
Second, most clinical trials are not designed with the clinical decision making process in 
mind.  In order to remedy this latter problem, some have recommended encouraging 
“pragmatic” or “practical” clinical trials (PCTs).  PCTs are those trials that are targeted 
                                                
137 Blumenthal, supra 132; D. Blumenthal, et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science:  
Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224 (1997); E.G. Campbell, et al., Data 
Withholding in Academic Genetics:  Evidence from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473 (2002). 
138 Tunis, supra note 35 at 1626. 
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toward producing information needed to make a decision in practice.139  PCTs must be 
designed to respond to clinical decision making.  They must “select clinically relevant 
interventions to compare, include a diverse population of study participants, recruit 
participants from a variety of practice settings, and collect data on a broad range of health 
outcomes.”140  Clinical trials that will be effective in informing prescribing decisions 
must include patients from high risk populations and must use diagnostic indicators that 
are commonly used in practice, which may be less definitive than other more 
sophisticated but less available diagnostic tools.141  They must also include patients who 
replicate the typical clinical population in terms of history of medication and medical 
conditions -- characteristics that are typically treated as excluding factors in clinical 
trials.142  In addition, the studies should be designed to compare effectiveness, cost and 
safety among available drugs and between medications and non-pharmaceutical 
therapies.143 Finally, clinical trials should account for variations in the quality of 
physician skills as such variations may have a substantial impact on the effectiveness of 
any therapy.144  Removing or regulating conflicts of interest in research will not stimulate 
more clinically-useful design. 
Furthermore, off-label prescribing and other treatment decisions also confront 
serious quantity and timeliness issues in clinical knowledge.  Several experts, for 
example, have noted that current clinical research endeavors are not producing “an 
adequate supply of information to meet the needs of clinicians and health policy 
                                                
139 D. Schwartz & J. Lellouch, Explanatory and Pragmatic Attitudes in Therapeutic Trials, 20 J. CHRONIC 
DIS. 637 (1967); M. Roland & D.J. Torgerson, What are Pragmatic Trials?, 316 BRITISH MEDICAL 
JOURNAL 285 (1998). 
140 Tunis, supra note 35 at 1626. 
141 Id. at 1626. 
142 Office of Inspector General, supra note 6, at 14. 
143 Tunis, supra note 35 at 1626. 
144 Id. at 1627.   
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makers.”145  The lack of clinical research effort reduces the effectiveness of clinical 
practice guidelines when those guidelines do not include “clear, specific 
recommendations,”146  and hampers payers who lack the information necessary to 
establish scientifically grounded coverage decisions.147  This insufficiency is certainly not 
explained by conflicts of interest.    In fact, restrictions on industry funding of research is 
likely to diminish the production of necessary clinical knowledge.148 
 Widespread concern for the credibility and reliability of clinical research in 
pharmaceuticals is apparent, but the solution is not.  The conflict-of-interest framework, 
especially to the extent that it relies on disclosure, does not effectively respond to the 
issue of the quality of particular articles, it merely sets a generic warning flag on the data, 
a warning flag that is nonspecific and, in the case of peer-reviewed published studies is 
countered by the peer-review “seal of approval.”  Counterintuitively, the warning flag 
may actually decrease sensitivity to conflicts of interest, by increasing the assumption of 
trustworthiness, as such disclosures have in the clinical setting,149 or conversely by 
reducing such disclosures to background chatter because of the pervasiveness of industry 
support for clinical trials.   
Efforts to assure that pharmaceutical firms do not cook the data or the 
interpretation of a trial are totally justifiable.  Exhorting them to voluntarily select and 
fund studies that do not contribute to or that may undermine their competitive position is 
probably futile, except in situations where patient safety is at issue.  Other options for 
                                                
145 Id. at 1625.  See also Soumerai, supra note 22, at 142, referencing the gap in timeliness and noting that 
“drug cost containment policy making often cannot wait for good evidence.” 
146 Id. 
147 Id.   
148 See supra text accompanying notes 65-72 and 95. 
149 See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text. 
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increasing the volume of post-approval clinical research beyond that required for safety 
surveillance typically require accounting for the cost of such research somewhere. 
Although the conflicts-of-interest tool addresses one aspect of imperfection in 
information for prescribing, it does so only roughly.  In addition, it does not contribute to 
stimulating the conduct of Phase IV trials, and may instead actually depress the 
development of post-marketing research.  Finally, the conflicts-of-interest approach does 
not provide a method for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate 
prescribing.   
Part III:  Through a Glass Darkly: False Claims Act Litigation and Off-Label 
Prescribing 
 Over the past two years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has enjoyed tremendous 
success in pursuing False Claims Act actions against pharmaceutical firms relating to off-
label prescribing and post-approval relationships with prescribing physicians.150  Included 
among the DOJ’s victories is the settlement of $455 million and guilty plea  
by the manufacturer of a single drug, Neurontin.  
The Neurontin-style litigation, whether hailed as “the best hope for short-term 
reform”151 or condemned as “inefficient” and “overly-aggressive,”152 is most often 
viewed as a dramatization of financial conflicts of interest in research and clinical 
decision making, fueled by pharmaceutical industry practices relating to prescribing.153  It 
                                                
150 See supra, note 7.  
151 David J. Rothman, Strong Medicine, THE NEW REPUBLIC (September 27, 2004), available at 2004 
WLNR 12846426. 
152 Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices:  Balancing Public Health and Law 
Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation Through Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH LAW 235, 264 
(2006). See also Ralph Hall and Robert Berlin, When You Have a Hammer, Everything Looks Like a Nail:  
Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 FOOD DRUG L. J. 653 (2006). 
153 See The Indictment of Pharma Industry Marketing Practices, INTERNAL MED. ALERT (Oct. 15, 2006); 
Valerie Jablow, Lawsuits Fault Off-Label Use of Neurontin in Suicide Cases, 40 TRIAL 12 (2004).  
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certainly does that.  Although never formally resolved by verdict or final judgment,154 the 
evidence strongly suggests that Parke-Davis,155 the defendant manufacturer of Neurontin, 
had used both educational and research efforts as vehicles to market the drug 
aggressively for off-label uses.156 
 Other insights emerge, however, when the course of the litigation and settlement 
are set parallel to contemporaneous and subsequent patterns of off-label prescribing for 
Neurontin.  Viewed in that context, the difficulties that arise in evaluating whether a 
particular off-label prescription is itself actually a “false claim” or in some other fashion 
inappropriate come into a sharper focus. Furthermore, the disreputable connotation of 
“off-label” as non-scientific or fraudulent is challenged by the subsequent FDA approval 
of Neurontin for particular indications that had become quite popular while in their “off-
label” stage and were, in fact, listed among the uses for which prescriptions were false 
claims.  The discussion of the case, thus, highlights the deficiencies in current forms of 
clinical research,157 both in making prescribing decisions and in regulating those 
decisions.  The case illustrates quite sharply the importance of appreciating the issue of 
                                                
154 It is unlikely that pharmaceutical defendants in fraud and abuse prosecutions will proceed to trial for a 
final judgment of violation of the statutes, as a 1996 federal statute provides that a Medicare or Medicaid 
provider found guilty of such violations must be excluded from those programs. In fact, in the Neurontin 
settlement, Parke-Davis pled guilty of violations only for behavior prior to 1996 to avoid exclusion from 
these reimbursement programs.   
155 Parke-Davis was the named defendant at the initiation of this litigation. This article refers to the 
defendant firm as Parke-Davis even though Warner-Lambert was the signatory for the settlement.  Parke-
Davis was a division of Warner-Lambert at that time.  Warner Lambert merged with Pfizer in 2000.  Pfizer 
agreed to a corporate compliance program for Warner-Lambert as part of the 2004 settlement agreement.   
For a lineage of the relationship among these firms, see http://www.pfizer.com/pfizer/history/2000.jsp   
156 Michael A. Steinman, et al., Narrative Review:  The Promotion of Gabapentin:  An Analysis of Internal 
Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 284 (2006), analyzing internal Parke-Davis 
documents concerning activities relating to prescribing of Neurontin and concluding that continuing 
medical education and research were used to promote Neurontin but noting that the documents were 
supplied by the relator’s attorneys.  Interestingly, three of the authors of that article served as unpaid expert 
witnesses in the litigation, a fact that is acknowledged within the text of the article, but is not revealed in 
the head material for the article.  Phil Kabler, Marketing Predated Firm’s Purchase, Pfizer Says, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 23, 2006, at 3C. 
157 See discussion in Part III. 
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off-label prescribing as more than simply an issue of inappropriate financial relationships 
in medicine and the challenge of regulating off-label prescribing in light of medical ways 
of knowing and learning.    
 Government regulation of pharmaceutical industry activities in post-approval 
marketing and research has been weak.158  Provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act restrict,159 but do not entirely prohibit,160 post-approval marketing of approved drugs 
for off-label uses.  In addition, court decisions concerning the constitutional boundaries 
on the authority of the agency to confine commercial speech have hampered aggressive 
enforcement of these provisions.161  Furthermore, the FDA largely relies on voluntary 
                                                
158 For a comprehensive overview of laws governing post-approval marketing of off-label uses for 
approved drugs, see Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of 
Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 41 (2005).  Private efforts to set boundaries on 
appropriate behavior in relationships between industry and researchers/prescribers have been increasing.  In 
addition to the journal policies discussed earlier, professional medical societies, including the AMA, and 
the drug industry trade association (PhRMA) have issued guidelines for relationships between prescribers 
and the companies, for example.  American Medical Association.  Code of Ethics.  E-8.06 Prescribing and 
Dispensing Drugs and Devices (2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8483.html; 
PhRMA Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals, available at 
http://www.phrma.org/files/PhRMA%20Code.pdf.  See also, American Academy of Family Physicians.  
(Issued 1998, Revised 2004).  AAFP Policies.  Disclosure of Corporate Ties Affecting Formulary Choices 
and Drug Substitution (1998, revised 2004),  available at 
http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/policy/policies/d/drugs.html.  The Office of Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services has recommended compliance with the private PhRMA 
guidelines “as a good starting point for compliance purposes.”  67 Fed. Reg. 62057, 62063 (Oct. 3, 2002).  
A few private universities also have established their own policies restricting or prohibiting particular 
marketing and educational activities or the part of pharmaceutical firms.  Stanford University Medical 
Center, for example, enacted a new policy on October 1, 2006, which prohibits physicians from accepting 
industry gifts, including drug samples, anywhere on the medical center campus or at off-site clinical 
facilities.  The policy further bars “pharmaceutical , bio-device and related industry representatives from 
patient care areas and medical school facilities except for in-service training on devices and equipment and 
by appointment only, as well as allowing industry support of educational activities only under well-
regulated conditions.” New Stanford Medical Center Policy Limits Drug Company Access and Gifts, MED. 
DEVICES (Oct. 15, 2006).   
159 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2004).  
160 The FDCA allows companies to distribute published peer-reviewed studies, for example. 21 U.S.C. § 
360(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
161 Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (1988).  The Washington Legal 
Foundation has established a project called “FDA/DDMAC Watch” through which it challenges FDA 
interventions in post-approval marketing.  See http://www.wlf.org/Resources/DDMAC/default.asp (Last 
visited on 9/28/06). See generally Nicole Endejann, Is the FDA’s Nose Growing?: The FDA Does Not 
“Exaggerate Its Overall Place in the Universe” When Regulating Speech Incident to “Off-Label” 
Prescription Drug Labeling and Advertising, 35 AKRON L. REV. 491, 499 (2002); David M. Fritch, Speak 
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compliance with its marketing restrictions and has devoted only limited resources to post-
approval marketing surveillance.162  Some have argued that the FDA’s relative inactivity 
in this arena is not due to regulatory philosophy or to limitations in resources but rather is 
due to the influence of pharmaceutical interests.163  Although some states have enacted 
statutes to address issues in the marketing of drugs, these efforts are relatively new and 
undeveloped and rely primarily on disclosure mechanisms.164 
 Federal agencies also regulate post-approval pharmaceutical research efforts 
through the mechanisms that govern research with human subjects generally.165  These 
regulations, often called the “Common Rule” because they have been promulgated in 
similar form by several federal agencies to govern private and public research that arises 
in the scope of their work, focus on protecting the individuals who participate as subjects 
in research protocols.166  These regulations generally delegate enforcement of the 
protective standards to the private research organization or university itself with only a 
second front of government oversight that has varied over time in its activity level. 
Several of the agencies, including the FDA, that share this “Common Rule” have issued 
guidance or regulations concerning financial relationships between researchers and 
                                                                                                                                              
No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient?  Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech 
From Drug Manufacturers on Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 315, 334 (2005). 
162 See Zalesky, supra note 152, describing the FDA’s policy of voluntary compliance and limited staff 
devoted to all advertising and marketing issues of approved drugs. 
163David Rothman notes that the OIG, in contrast to the FDA, seems to be “oddly . . . immune to political 
pressure as they try to rein in drug companies.”  Rothman, supra note 151. 
164 Id. at 253.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 48-833.01 (2004). 
165 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 46.101 et seq. (regulating research funded by the Department of Health and Human 
Services); 21 C.F.R. 50.1 et seq. (regulating research funded by the FDA or which will be submitted to the 
FDA in relation to agency action).  These requirements have a broader reach than indicated in the 
regulations themselves as research universities typically agree to apply the federal regulations to all 
research conducted within the university or by university employees; CARL H. COLEMAN, ET AL., THE 
ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 107 (LexisNexis (a division of Matthew 
Bender) 2005).   
166 Id. at 106. 
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sponsors, including sponsors of pharmaceutical research.167  Essentially, these conflicts-
of-interest regulations rely on the same delegation to private research organizations that 
characterizes the “Common Rule” generally.  The conflicts-of-interest guidance or 
regulations require that the research organization have a written policy; that researchers 
disclose conflicts of interest to the research organization; that the organization operate an 
internal review mechanism; and that the organization manage, reduce or eliminate 
conflicts of interest, as appropriate.168  Guidance on conflicts of interest in research from 
the Department of Health and Human Services is even more general, and consists mostly 
of questions and points that the institution might consider in implementing an internal 
conflict of interest policy, while the FDA provides for agency evaluation of financial 
interest disclosures.169 
In contrast to the limitations imposed upon or adopted by the FDA in regulating 
industry-prescriber interactions, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services have adopted 
an aggressive litigation strategy to regulate industry post-approval marketing and clinical 
research funding, especially as these relate to off-label prescribing.  In fact, the OIG has 
                                                
167 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. 54.4 (FDA); 42 C.F.R. 50.604 (HHS).  Conflicts of interest regulation is justified as 
an element of protecting the subjects of research because research with human subjects must provide 
benefits that outweigh the risks of the studies.  To the extent that conflicts of interest may compromise the 
validity or usefulness of the results, they may alter the risk-benefit calculus.   
168 42 C.F.R. 50.604; 68 Fed. Reg. 15456-01 (March 31, 2003).   See e.g., Peter J. Harrington, Faculty 
Conflicts of Interest in an Age of Academic Entrepreneurialism: An Analysis of the Problem, the Law and 
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169 42 C.F.R. 50.604 (HHS); 21 C.F.R. 54.4 (FDA). The FDA regulations require that applicants for FDA 
action submit either a certification that investigators of submitted studies do not have conflicts of interest or 
a disclosure statement that discloses the investigator financial interests that do exist.  For investigators 
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been taken to eliminate “bias created by a disclosable financial interest.” 
 46
identified industry-prescriber relationships as a primary target for enforcement efforts.170  
The DOJ and OIG wield an assault weapon in the form of civil and criminal enforcement 
of statutes designed to protect the government’s financial interests in public programs,171 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, to establish boundaries on post-approval marketing and 
funding of research by pharmaceutical firms.172   This high-profile litigation strategy is 
currently the primary “regulatory” effort for off-label marketing, industry-funded clinical 
trials, and prescribing.  The Neurontin litigation discussed in this section is the most 
notable episode in this effort. 
The FDA approved Neurontin (gabapentin) in 1994 for use as adjunctive therapy 
for epilepsy.173  Shortly after its approval, physicians were prescribing Neurontin as a 
monotherapy for epilepsy; for pain control for a large number of pain states, including 
post-herpetic neuropathy; for bipolar disorder; for attention deficit disorder; for ALS; for 
migraine; for restless leg syndrome; for sleep disorders; and for a variety of other uses.  
In fact, in 1995, one year after approval of Neurontin, 40% of the prescriptions written 
for the medication were for off-label indications.174   
 The Neurontin litigation began when Dr. David Franklin, a medical liaison 
employed by Parke-Davis, filed a qui tam action in 1996.  In his lawsuit, Franklin alleged 
                                                
170 Edward Lansdale, Use As Directed?  How Prosecutors are Expanding the False Claims Act to Police 
Pharmaceutical Off-Label Marketing, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 159 (2006); Marc J. Scheineson and Shannon 
T. Klinger, Lessons From Expanded Government Enforcement Efforts Against Drug Companies, 60 FOOD 
& DRUG L. J. 1 (2005); Robert Brady, et al., Pharmaceutical Companies Have Been Penalized for Pushing 
Their Products for Unapproved Uses, NAT’L L.J.,  March 20, 2006, detailing recent actions and 
settlements.  See also, supra note 7. 
171 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b (anti-kickback statute) and 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733 (false claims act). 
172 Although this article focuses on pharmaceuticals, similar issues have arisen in the promotion of medical 
devices.  See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Whistle-Blower Suit Says Device Maker Generously Rewards Doctors, 
N.Y. Times (January 24, 2006). See U.S. ex rel. Gilligan v. Medtronic, Inc., 403 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2005). 
173 U.S. ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 3945 (D. Mass. 2001).  See also, “Neurontin,” in 
Physician’s Desk Reference, 2005 WL 1158514. 
174 Darryl Haralson and Thomas Ankner, Drugmaker Admitted Fraud, But Sales Flourish, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 17, 2004, 01A.  Prescribing patterns for Neurontin during the litigation and after the settlement are 
described infra at text accompanying notes 209-213. 
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that Parke-Davis illegally incentivized physicians to write prescriptions for Neurontin 
which would be paid for by government medical payment programs, including Medicare, 
Medicaid and Veterans’ Administration programs.  Franklin argued, among other 
theories, that these prescriptions amounted to false claims against the government in 
violation of the False Claims Act.   
Defendant Parke-Davis filed a motion to dismiss Franklin’s claims on several 
grounds.  The firm argued that the firm itself filed no false claims as the doctors who 
prescribed the drug, and thus caused the government programs to make payment, were an 
“intervening force.”   It also argued that the False Claims Act could not be used to 
enforce the FDA’s restrictions on promotion of approved drugs for off-label uses.  The 
court rejected each of these arguments as they applied to the relator’s claims concerning 
prescriptions for Neurontin paid for by the Medicare and Medicaid programs.175 
Parke-Davis argued that it had not filed a single claim for reimbursement from 
any governmental entity for prescriptions for Neurontin.   It argued that, because only 
physicians can prescribe, it was only the physicians who had filed a claim, whether false 
or not.176  The doctors, according to Parke-Davis, were an “intervening force” and as 
such the necessary causal link between its own behavior and the false claims was 
missing.  According to the court, however, the doctors’ actions were foreseeable and 
                                                
175Franklin,  147 F. Supp. 2d 39.  The court did dismiss the relator’s claims relating to Accupril, another 
drug produced by Parke-Davis for insufficient specificity in pleading. Id. at 50.  The court also dismissed 
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176 This defense mimics the “learned intermediary” defense that has been available to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in products liability suits.   
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were, in fact, the “intended consequence of the alleged scheme of fraud,”satisfying the 
requirement of causation.177   
The court also rejected Parke-Davis’ argument that the False Claims Act could 
not be used to enforce the provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act concerning 
promotion of off-label uses.  The court rejected this argument holding that the violation 
of the FDCA could be pursued under the False Claims Act if the violation of the FDCA 
“amounts to a material misrepresentation made to obtain a government benefit.”178   In 
the view of the court, the False Claims Act simply provided tools not available to the 
FDA, including civil money damages and private enforcement, for the enforcement of its 
restrictions on promotion of off-label uses.179 
The court contended with two central issues in applying false claims standards to 
Parke-Davis’ marketing efforts.  First, while particular activities, such as discussing off-
label uses without an initial physician inquiry, may formally violate the FDCA 
restrictions on marketing, can those communications properly be considered false claims 
unless the representations themselves are inaccurate or false?  Second, if the non-
approved indications for which the drug is marketed and prescribed are legitimate uses 
covered by the federal payment program, can they be false claims by virtue of their status 
as off-label or by the very fact that the firm had marketed these off-label uses to doctors?  
The court rejected the firm’s argument in its motion to dismiss that off-label 
promotions, even when in violation of the FDCA, are not per se false statements within 
the meaning of the False Claims Act.  The court rejected this argument, apparently 
relying on the relator’s claims in this particular case that the firm knowingly made false 
                                                
177 Id. at 53. 
178 Id. at 51. 
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statements about the drug’s performance.180  The court in this opinion, however, stated 
that “[a] much closer question would be presented if the allegations involved only the 
unlawful – yet truthful – promotion of off-label uses . . .”.181   
In considering Parke-Davis’ later submission of a motion for summary judgment, 
however, the court revisited the issue of whether truthful information provided to 
physicians, but still an illegal promotion under the FDCA, could form the root of a false 
claim for prescribing..  In this later unpublished opinion, the court concluded that 
defendant’s “non-fraudulent” promotion of Neurontin for off-label uses could, indeed, 
result in a false claim, but only if the Medicaid program did not cover the off-label uses at 
issue.182  Thus, there would be no false claim, in the case of non-fraudulent promotional 
efforts that nonetheless violated the FDCA, if the state Medicaid program covered the 
specific off-label prescriptions at issue.183 
According to the court’s opinion ruling on the firm’s motion to dismiss, Parke-
Davis did not “dispute that an off-label prescription submitted for reimbursement by 
                                                
180 Franklin, 147 F.Supp.2d at 52. 
181 Id. 
182 Standards for coverage of prescriptions for off-label uses under Medicaid is discussed infra at text 
accompanying notes 235-238. 
183 The court’s opinion is somewhat confused about the scope of Medicaid coverage, a not uncommon 
occurrence; and the court says that it “would appreciate an amicus brief from federal officials” on the 
question of coverage.  Another court took a different view of the key issue in Parke-Davis.  In U.S. ex rel. 
Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., 2006 WL 1064127 (E.D. Mo. 2006), the court interprets the earlier Parke-
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unreliable and misleading,” but not false.  Id. at 9.  See also, U.S. ex rel. McDermott, 2006 WL 3741920 at 
13, dismissing relator’s qui tam False Claims Act claim relating to defendant’s promotion of off-label use 
of a biological product in part because the off-label use was reimbursable under Medicaid as that use was 
listed in one of the statutory compendia despite evidence that Genentech had pursued an aggressive 
marketing campaign that included allegations of ghostwriting of journal articles.  Hess and Genentech raise 
significant questions about the continued viability of qui tam actions relating to off-label promotion and 
certainly challenge the extensive reach of the standards used in Parke-Davis. They don’t necessarily 
diminish the ability of the DOJ to get settlements for government claims regarding the same behaviors, 
however.  See supra note 154. 
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Medicaid is a false claim” in its motion to dismiss the qui tam action.184  Even though 
Parke-Davis apparently did not dispute this proposition at that point in this litigation, it is 
not an accurate statement of the law. It is well-established that Medicaid programs must 
cover off-label prescriptions under certain circumstances.185  Under the Medicaid 
program, prescription drugs are not covered if the drugs are prescribed “for a medical 
indication which is not a medically accepted indication.”186  An off-label or unapproved 
use, however, can be a “medically accepted indication” under the Medicaid statute if the 
off-label indication is included in one of the drug compendia listed in the federal 
statute.187  The court in its opinion denying the motion to dismiss states that none of the 
off-label uses at issue in the litigation were listed in any of the compendia during the time 
covered by the lawsuit.188  In its later opinion denying Parke-Davis’ subsequent motion 
for summary judgment, however, the District Court further studied the question of 
whether the off-label uses of Neurontin were covered by Medicaid, at this point viewed 
by the court as a key question in whether a False Claims Act action for promotion of off-
label uses would survive.  In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that 
forty-two state Medicaid programs covered “off-label, non-compendium” 
prescriptions.189  While the court does not resolve whether states, in fact, have such 
latitude under the federal Medicaid statute, it concludes that at least eight states did not 
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provide coverage for off-label, non-compendium prescriptions and that, at least as to 
those states, the False Claims Act claims could survive. The court holds that the 
defendant’s argument thus goes to the amount of damages rather than to whether there 
are sufficient facts to support a claim.190 
 The Department of Justice, which had monitored the Neurontin litigation from its 
filing by the private relator,191 took an active role in the litigation after the District 
Court’s rulings denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary 
judgment.192  Once it entered the case, the DOJ resurrected the allegation of false claims 
against the Veterans Administration,193 which had been dismissed by the trial judge.   In 
addition, state attorneys general joined the action to file claims to recover the payments 
made by their states under the federal-state Medicaid program as well as claims under 
state consumer protection statutes.194   
The DOJ characterized Parke-Davis’s actions as “a widespread, coordinated 
national effort to implement an off-label marketing plan.”195 As is often the case in qui 
tam litigation, internal communications provided the interpretive framework or narrative 
for the government’s suit.  First, a Parke-Davis marketing executive allegedly told the 
company’s medical liaisons that the FDA-approved use for Neurontin “is not where the 
                                                
190 Id. at 3.   
191 The district court notes that the suit was “in limbo” from its filing in 1996 until 1999 “while the United 
States mulled over its option to intervene.” Franklin, 147 F.Supp.2d. at 46. 
192 In the 2003 proceeding, the federal government had filed only a “statement of interest” and had not yet 
intervened.  Franklin, 2003 WL 22048255 (D.Mass.) at 1. 
193 Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
194See, e.g., Rubel v. Pfizer, Inc., 276 F.Supp. 904 (N.D.Ill. 2003).  Many of the states that received funds 
through the settlement agreement used a portion of the proceeds to support programs on physician 
prescribing practices.  See, e.g., Attorney General Myers Announces Prescription Drug Education Grants, 
US State News, November, 1 2006, 2006 WLNR 19147009. 
195 Department of Justice, supra note 3.  See also, Steinman, supra note 156, in which the authors analyze 
company documents and conclude that Parke-Davis’ educational and research efforts were both part of the 
marketing plan for Neurontin.   
 52
money is.  I want you out there every day selling Neurontin” for off-label uses.196  In 
addition, an advertising firm working for the company produced a report entitled “1998 
Neurontin Tactics” which recommended that the company hold educational programs on 
the use of Neurontin for bi-polar disorder and other off-label uses of the drug.197   
Particular educational/marketing activities alleged by DOJ to be illegal included 
encouraging sales representatives to pitch off-label use without a prior inquiry from the 
physician in violation of FDA standards for post-approval marketing.198  The Department 
also challenged the company’s sponsorship of continuing medical education.  Parke-
Davis sponsored “independent medical education” events, as do most pharmaceutical 
companies.  In this case, however, DOJ alleged that Parke-Davis as sponsor selected the 
topics, speakers, and content of the programs and planted questions from the floor to 
assure that the drug would be showcased as it desired.  In addition, Parke-Davis 
conducted teleconferences in which physicians discussed their experience in prescribing 
Neurontin for off-label uses, with the company paying physician-speakers as well as 
paying doctors enrolled in the teleconference for their time.199   The DOJ further alleged 
that Parke-Davis representatives made misleading statements about efficacy of the drug 
for particular purposes.200    
                                                
196 Douglas McLeod, Lawsuits Mount Over Marketing of Epilepsy Drug, 38 BUS. INS. 3 (June 
14, 2004). 
197 Neurontin Tactics, available at http://dida.library.ucsf.edu/pdf/ida00a10. 
198 This activity actually may be protected under Washington Legal Foundation, 13 F.Supp.2d 51 (1988).  
See supra note 161.  See also Greene, supra, note 158. 
199 See  Steinman, supra note 156.  See also,  EPSTEIN supra note 5 at 154, arguing that for doctors “time is 
money, and any hour spent gathering information about new drugs is an hour away from some other part of 
their practice. . . . Many of these promotional efforts at wining and dining are understood in part as efforts 
to cover the opportunity cost of time.” 
200 The Justice Department singled out the promotion of Neurontin for “bipolar disease” and “monotherapy 
for epileptic seizure.”  Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
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 The evidence, as presented by the relator and DOJ, also indicates that the firm’s 
funding of post-approval clinical research on off-label uses for Neurontin also was a part 
of the marketing effort.  The government and the relator alleged that doctors participating 
in study protocols for Neurontin received substantial payments for enrolling their patients 
in the protocol while having minimal obligations for data collection or analysis.201   In 
addition, the clinical trials often were open label (where doctor and patient were aware of 
which drug was being used) a study design generally viewed as inferior to random 
controlled trials especially where measures of improvement rely on patient self-reporting.  
The OIG had specifically expressed concerns about these and similar structural practices 
in post-marketing clinical research in a 1994 Fraud Alert.202  Finally, Parke-Davis 
originated the grants and protocols in their marketing department rather than in their 
research department, a practice that the government identified as “suspect activity” in 
OIG guidance issued after the initiation of the lawsuit but before the settlement.203 
 In 2004, Parke-Davis entered into a settlement with the federal and state 
governments.  Parke-Davis paid $152 million plus interest to reimburse both the federal 
($83.6 million) and the state ($68.4 million) governments for off-label prescriptions for 
Neurontin paid for by the state-federal Medicaid program.  The company also settled 
state consumer protection claims for $38 million plus interest.  The company also 
accepted a mandatory corporate compliance program.  Finally, the firm pled guilty to the 
charge that some of its post-approval communications with physicians violated the 
restrictions of the FDCA and, therefore, violated the False Claims Act.  Parke-Davis paid 
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a criminal fine of $240 million for this violation.  The qui tam relator recovered an 
additional $24.64 million from the firm as part of the settlement as well.204 
In all, Parke-Davis paid over $455 million, the largest settlement for such 
litigation to that date.205  The settlement also spawned several subsequent class action 
lawsuits against Parke-Davis by private insurers, including Aetna and the Teamsters, and 
by self-insured employers to recover what the insurance plans had paid for off-label 
prescriptions for Neurontin206 as well as products liability and consumer protection 
claims by patients themselves.207 
The DOJ and Parke-Davis disagreed over whether the firm’s activities fell within 
the ambit of the False Claims Act both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.  DOJ, 
however, produced significant evidence that the firm’s activities crossed over into suspect 
practices, including practices that the government had identified earlier as potential fraud; 
and Parke-Davis admitted to certain violations and paid the largest settlement to date for 
a pharmaceutical case that did not involve pricing or kickback issues, perhaps in part 
because of the overwhelming risk of exclusion from the Medicare program if the DOJ 
succeeded in proving its case in court.208 
                                                
204 Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
205 An earlier federal criminal investigation of TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., resulted in a guilty plea 
and payment of approximately $875,000,000 by TAP in 2001.  The issues in the TAP litigation did not 
involve off-label prescribing, but focused instead on TAP’s pricing practices for Medicare reimbursement 
as well as marketing practices. Department of Justice Press Release,  TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. 
and Seven Others Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to Settle 
Charges, October 3, 2001 available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm  Pricing was 
not involved in the Neurontin litigation.   
206 In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, 433 F.Supp.2d 172 (MDL 
2006), holding that plaintiff private insurers stated a claim against the manufacturer under the federal 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 
207 See The Indictment of Pharma Industry Marketing Practices, INTERNAL MED. ALERT (Oct. 15, 2006); 
Jablow, supra note 153.  See also Rubel v. Pfizer, 276 F.Supp.2d 904 (2003); Dellinger v. Pfizer, 2006 WL 
2057654 (W.D.N.C.).  
208 See supra note 154.  In addition, the settlement was actually approved by Pfizer, Inc., which had 
acquired Warner-Lambert/Parke-Davis during the course of this litigation (see supra note 155); and Pfizer 
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The “rest of the story” in this instance, however, does not lie in deciding whether 
the Department’s narrative or the defendant’s counter story about the company’s 
behavior is true, but rather in what was happening to Neurontin prescribing during the 
course of the litigation and thereafter.  In 2002, 94% of Neurontin prescriptions were for 
off-label indications, up from 40% in 1995.209  Neurontin sales amounted to $2.7 billion 
in 2003, of which nearly $2.5 billion was for off-label uses.210   
One might expect that Neurontin prescribing patterns would change as physicians 
learned of the government’s high-profile attack on off-label prescribing of Neurontin and 
allegations of misleading marketing, but that is not the case.  In August, 2004, two years 
into the state and federal governments’ pursuit of the lawsuit and shortly after the 
attention-grabbing settlement, sales of Neurontin had actually increased by 32% over the 
same quarter the year before.211  Lehman Brothers estimated that the great bulk of those 
prescriptions for Neurotin -- 90% of sales, in fact -- were still for off-label uses.212  In 
fact, only in 2006, did another medication surpass sales of Neurontin for neuropathic 
pain, which was an off-label use for Neurontin during the course of the litigation until its 
approval by the FDA (only as to cases in which neuropathic pain is associated with 
shingles) in 2002; and this was due to the expiration of its patent protection and the 
resultant entry of generics.213   
                                                                                                                                              
deflected fault by stating that the activities “did not involve Pfizer practices or employees.”  Kabler, supra 
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The persistence of off-label prescribing for Neurontin even after the eye-popping 
settlement and guilty plea in this case, could be attributed to the observed persistence of 
prescribing habits in physicians described earlier.214  In other words, once brand loyalty 
has been purchased, it continues even after the flow of money and perquisites stops.   
 In this case, however, some of the off-label prescribing of Neurontin actually was 
good medicine despite the fact that at the time no rigorous clinical studies supported the 
uses for which practicing doctors were prescribing the medication.  Off-label prescribing 
decisions, even though stimulated by pharmaceutical detailing, may be justified and may 
provide essential care for patients.  Apparently, this was the case with the off-label use of 
Neurontin for relief of neuropathic pain. 
Neuropathic pain is one of the most treatment-resistant pain conditions that exist.  
Such pain is chronic and debilitating and does not respond to more common pain 
medications, including opioids.215  It is not surprising that doctors trying to treat patients 
with neuropathic pain, and the patients themselves, would be willing to try innovative 
therapies to get some relief. So it happened that doctors began to use Neurontin for 
neuropathic pain despite the fact that no rigorous clinical studies supported its use for that 
purpose.  Patients experienced relief with Neurontin, and Parke-Davis apparently spread 
the word to its own benefit, but also to the benefit of patients in pain.  In 2002, the FDA 
formally approved Neurontin for the treatment of post-herpetic neuropathic pain, i.e., 
nerve pain associated with shingles,216 in the midst of the Neurontin prosecution.  
Neurontin has not been approved for the treatment of neuropathic pain caused by other 
                                                
214 See supra note 51. 
215 See, e.g., Steve Simon, et al., Breakthrough Pain in Opioid-Treated Patients with Neuropathic Pain, 2 J. 
OF OPIOID MANAGEMENT 347, 347 (2006). 
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disease states, and it won’t be.  Nor is the drug likely to be subjected to double-blind, 
random-controlled clinical trials in persons suffering neuralgia from other conditions as 
the patent for the drug has expired and generics are taking control of the market.217  The 
absence of clinical trials does not mean that Neurontin (now generic gabapentin) is not 
effective in treating these highly similar pain states just as FDA approval in 2002 didn’t 
make the drug effective for treating pain.  Nor was the experience of doctors and patients 
who observed the pain relieving effect of Neurontin “false” even though it would be 
categorized as “anecdotal.”   
The Neurontin litigation was not solely focused on the use of Neurontin for 
neuropathic pain, of course.  The Justice Department specifically referenced the 
promotion of the drug for bipolar disorder, ALS, attention deficit disorder, migraine, 
withdrawal seizures, and restless leg syndrome in addition to “various pain states” in its 
statements describing the settlement, for example.218  Certainly, Neurontin may not be 
effective in treating all of these disorders; and surely it is distinctly possible that Parke-
Davis representatives exaggerated the evidence regarding these uses.  The now-proven 
effectiveness of Neurontin for neuropathic pain (but only that related to shingles) 
illustrates one of the challenges in establishing that inappropriate marketing causes 
inappropriate and ineffective prescribing. 
Nearly one-third of the amount paid by Parke-Davis ($152 million plus interest) 
was paid to the state and federal governments as reimbursement for payments made for 
                                                
217 See Hoover’s, supra 20, documenting a 77% decline in revenue from Neurontin after patent expiration; 
Department of Justice, supra note 3, observing that the defendant did not pursue approval of off-label uses 
because of the impending expiration of the patent on Neurontin. 
218 Department of Justice, supra note 3. 
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off-label prescriptions of Neurontin for Medicaid beneficiaries.219  This payment signals  
that the government (as purchaser for the program’s beneficiaries) did not get what it paid 
for when it paid for off-label prescriptions of this drug.  Parke-Davis was accused, for 
example, of “steal[ing] from taxpayers” when it promoted off-label uses of Neurontin.220 
After the settlement, however, Neurontin continued to be the third highest drug cost for 
some state Medicaid programs.221   
It would be reasonable for state Medicaid programs to turn the False Claims Act 
litigation, essentially a damning autopsy of the firm’s behavior, into prospective payment 
regulation.  Even a year after the settlement produced “re-payments” to the Medicaid 
programs for prescriptions written prior to the date of settlement, however, state 
Medicaid programs continued to pay for off-label use of Neurontin without any 
significant change in payment standards.222   If Parke-Davis was required to repay the 
Medicaid program for the off-label prescribing it stimulated, because these prescriptions 
amounted to false claims, then why would the state continue to pay for those same 
prescriptions after the date of the settlement?  The State of Florida decided it would not 
do so. 
In 2004, “following news reports that Neurontin was being widely prescribed for 
off-label uses and that reimbursement for the drug by state Medicaid programs was 
significant,” the Florida legislature acted to encourage the state Medicaid agency to 
constrain reimbursement for off-label prescriptions of Neurontin.223  The legislation 
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specifically authorized the agency to implement a prior authorization program for “off-
label uses of Medicaid-covered prescribed drugs” that would require doctors “to provide 
information about the rational and supporting medical evidence for the off-label use of 
the drug.”224 
In July, 2004, the Florida Medicaid agency established a policy under which it 
would pay for Neurontin only for its approved uses (adjunctive therapy for epileptic 
seizures225 and neuropathic pain associated with shingles) and for off-label uses “only 
when safety and efficacy were proven by double-blind, placebo controlled, randomized 
clinical trials.”226  However, the agency decided to reimburse for two unapproved 
indications for which there were no clinical studies proving the drug effective.  These two 
uses were the prescription of Neurontin for ALS, for which the FDA had formally 
categorized Neurontin as an “orphan drug,”227 and for diabetic peripheral neuropathy.228  
Thus, the agency refused to pay for prescriptions of Neurontin for any uses other than 
adjunctive therapy for epileptic seizures and partial refractory seizures; for post-herpetic 
neuropathic pain and diabetic peripheral neuropathy; and for ALS.  It excluded, for 
example, prescriptions for Neurontin for the treatment of neuropathic pain unless the 
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patient had shingles or diabetes.  Patients with neuropathic pain from medical conditions 
other than shingles or diabetes filed suit.229 
 Florida claimed that its coverage decisions for Neurontin complied with the 
federal Medicaid requirement that the state cover off-label uses that are “supported by 
one or more citations”230 in the accepted drug compendia.231  The American Hospital 
Formulary Service Drug Informant (AHFS) listed several off-label uses for Neurontin, 
including its use for neuropathic and neurogenic pain resulting from a variety of medical 
conditions, but did not provide any citations to studies or journal articles for any of these 
uses.232  Another of the approved compendia, DRUGDEX, listed fifty-four uses for 
Neurontin.  DRUGDEX classified each use as “effective, possibly effective, or 
ineffective” and rated the available documentation of effectiveness as “excellent, good, 
fair, and poor.”233  All but three of the fifty-four uses listed in this publication were 
recognized as either “effective” or “possibly effective.”  Of the three uses categorized in 
DRUGDEX as “ineffective,” Florida’s Medicaid program actually covered two: ALS and 
a specific manifestation of epilepsy.234  
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 The District Court held that the Florida agency’s policy violated the coverage 
mandated in the federal Medicaid program.  The court recognized that the state could 
have followed other routes within its authority under the federal Medicaid statute to 
control Medicaid payments for Neurontin prescriptions, which would have required case-
by-case review for individual patients,235 but that the method used by the state violated 
the statutory mandate.   
In particular, the court noted that the state’s requirement that an off-label use 
would be covered only if it were supported by “double-blind, placebo-controlled 
randomized clinical trials” misinterpreted the statute as “this is the same standard 
employed for FDA-approved uses” and it “is the equivalent of saying the same thing 
twice.”236  The court said further: 
If Congress had intended that “medically accepted indications” must be supported 
by double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trials, it would have said 
so. . . [Amendments of the statutory provision at issue] over the years substantiate 
the notion that Congress intended coverage for off-label uses, many of which 
would obviously not be supported by the same strict criteria required for FDA 
approval.237  
 
 The core of the injury alleged and recovered for in the Neurontin litigation was 
that inappropriate marketing corrupted medical decision making with the result that the 
states paid for unnecessary or ineffective product.238  Prescription of  Neurontin for 
certain unapproved uses (for example, for neuropathic pain) did not injure the states in 
this fashion. In fact, Medicaid patients receiving the drug for those purposes received 
effective and necessary treatment even if the prescription was off-label, and even if their 
doctors learned of this use through firm-sponsored marketing.  Although the FDA has not 
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approved Neurontin for the treatment of neuropathic pain generated by diseases or 
injuries other than shingles, it seems entirely reasonable for physicians to believe that the 
drug may be effective for those pain states as well, especially if patients are reporting 
positive results. 
It was also logical for the Florida Medicaid agency to address the forward flow of 
dollars after the Neurontin settlement.  Although the agency was thwarted in this effort 
by the federal Medicaid statute, its experience is more generalizable.  Requiring the 
completion of “double-blind, placebo-controlled randomized clinical trials” as a 
prerequisite for covering prescriptions for medications for unapproved uses appeals to the 
notion of medicine as science, but would have prevented patients in some cases from 
receiving the only effective care available.239 
 Private insurers have fared no better than the State of Florida in their attempts to 
control individual off-label prescribing decisions, and their challenges have nothing to do 
with the Medicaid statute.  The hesitancy of private payers to involve themselves in 
reining in off-label prescribing may be a simple matter of administrative convenience.  If 
their primary concern is to control drug costs, there are less expensive methods for doing 
so.  These include shifting costs to consumers through co-pays, tiered benefit systems, 
prior authorization requirements, and step therapy (“fail first”) mechanisms.240  These are 
hardly satisfactory as methods for evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of an 
off-label or any prescription for that matter because they erect barriers unrelated to the 
effectiveness of medications. 
                                                
239 Of course, the methods for controlling prescribing that are permitted in the federal Medicaid scheme 
may also harm patients. Kleinke, supra note 22. 
240 Id. 
 63
 There are, of course, emerging efforts to constrain prescribing, especially off-
label prescribing, within a rubric of effectiveness and quality rather than cost control. 
These efforts face several significant obstacles discussed in this paper.  First, these efforts 
must address directly the inadequate quantity and quality of post-approval research on 
approved drugs and the resulting deficiencies in clinical guidelines.  Public funding for 
such trials is simply inadequate; private funding by pharmaceutical firms has been made 
suspect; incentives for private funding by private insurers are limited when they can 
achieve their cost-containment goals through much less expensive means; and incentives 
for the insurers to share the knowledge they produce on other than a proprietary basis are 
nearly nonexistent.  Moreover, if private insurers and pharmacy benefit managers begin 
to provide serious funding for clinical trials, who is to say that this funding also won’t be 
viewed as suspect for the same reasons of self-serving interests that are now recited for 
pharmaceutical funding?  Second, even if a robust program of Phase IV clinical trials of 
expanded uses for approved drugs does emerge, there will still be the irreducible clinical 
uncertainties – uncertainties caused by unavoidable temporal gaps between the 
immediacy of clinical decision making and the slow clock required for trials to be 
conceived, designed, and executed as well as uncertainties caused by the performance of 
the drug on individual patients.   
V.  Conclusion   
 We can view the Neurontin litigation as catching a bad actor.  Certainly, the 
evidence of Parke-Davis’ marketing, educational and research practices provides 
sufficient support for that view.  With that perspective, the litigation simply dramatizes 
the conflicts-of- interest narrative of pharmaceutical firm-prescriber co-dependencies. 
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 The litigation, the persistence of off-label prescribing post-litigation, and the 
difficulties encountered in translating the recovery of Medicaid payments into 
prospective controls raise broader issues than those that will fit under the conflicts-of-
interest umbrella, however.  Conflicts-of-interest regulation, both public and private, 
works only at the margins of the issues raised in this situation.  While conflicts-of-interest 
surveillance and management may produce some benefits, this approach can also give a 
false sense of problem solved even though those interventions do not reach the core 
issues of the production and dissemination of clinical knowledge.  Conflicts-of-interest 
restrictions may remove one source generating increased distrust of the research 
enterprise, even though this distrust may be misplaced.  Conflicts-of-interest restrictions 
won’t fund post-marketing research, and may actually reduce current resources if the 
risks of industry funding of post-approval trials include criminal and civil prosecution; 
won’t improve physician learning, and appears to be  reducing educational opportunities 
as firms react to increased risks; and won’t fill the knowledge voids within which both 
doctors and regulators currently practice.  
 Even if the financial relationships between prescribing doctors and Parke-Davis 
were inappropriate and perhaps illegal, the existence of those relationships did not prove 
that the off-label prescriptions were themselves inappropriate.  Off-label prescribing, 
even where clinical trials proving efficacy for new indications have not yet begun or are 
not yet completed, can bring great benefit to patients.  Of course, such prescribing can 
also subject patients to ineffective medications with the attendant costs and risks.  The 
real challenge isn’t detecting and prosecuting the zealous marketing efforts of a Parke-
Davis, but rather it is assuring that patients get good care.  Raising the risks for 
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pharmaceutical firms in funding Phase IV clinical trials and continuing medical education 
won’t get us there.  Nor will targeting off-label prescribing as if there were no risks in 
doing so. 
   
  
 
